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In Australia, invasive alien species (IAS) are the second largest threat to biodiversity after 
loss of habitat. International obligations provide that Australia should prevent the 
introduction of, or control or eradicate those alien species that threaten ecosystems, 
habitats or species. Yet, designing and implementing effective IAS regimes remains 
elusive. It is a multidimensional exercise that engages a variety of actors across all levels 
of government. The purpose of this paper is to examine complications stemming from 
governance of IAS regimes in federal systems where law-making power is shared.  
 
It is argued that Australia has created a governance system for IAS largely based on 
political compromises that still presents the Federal government with the opportunity of 
providing a national framework for regulation of IAS. However, the Federal government 
has only partially grasped this opportunity, leaving the regime peppered with gaps and 
inconsistencies that fall short of the potential available to it.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
On 1 January 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 
(Australian Constitution or Constitution) commenced, creating Australia’s Federal 
system of government. As with other federal systems of government, law-making power 
was henceforth to be shared1 – in Australia’s case, between a central, Federal Parliament 
and the State and Territory Parliaments.  
 
However, while the Constitution apportioned law-making powers, it did not settle 
broader regulatory issues with respect to determination of policy and the design and 
implementation of regimes. These are especially important matters where governments 
operate in multi-layered and overlapping ways and each government has its own view on 
the best means of achieving effective regulation.2 In such cases, carving out lines of 
legislative authority may be achieved by formalising the role of various parliaments,3 yet 
effective regimes will often also involve compromises and procedures that have their 
foundation in extra-parliamentary and/or political processes.4 Indeed, the structure of 
federal systems of government raises complex governance issues that lie at the very heart 
of the division and exercise of legislative power. More specifically, these issues include: 
considering  which level of government would deliver the most effective outcomes; 
determining whether regimes should be centralized; and deciding which level of 
government should  have input into concluding policy. These considerations help shape 
measures that in turn create ‘good order’; a notion that was coined by the Greek 
philosopher, Aristotle, more than 2,000 years ago. It is a concept that is still relevant 
today, although more easily recognized as the study of what scholars now call 
‘governance’.  
 
According to the Oxford dictionary, governance is ‘the action or manner of governing’.5 
It encompasses a range of concerns that influence decision-making,6 including conflict 
                                                 
*Sophie Riley, senior lecturer in law at the University of Technology Sydney. The first part of the title to 
this paper is attributed to Aristotle, a Greek philosopher who lived from 384BC to 322 BC. Research 
assistance, which is gratefully acknowledged, has been provided by Clary Castrission pursuant to a Public 
Purpose Fund Grant from the Law Society of New South Wales. 
1 Other countries with federal systems of government include the United States of America, Canada, 
Nigeria and Switzerland; Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries McGill-Queen’s University Press (20060. For an analysis and synthesis 
on the vast literature on this subject see Ronald L Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems and 
Federations’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science 117. 
2 See discussion in part 5 of this paper with respect to environmental regulation in Australia. 
3 Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’ [1997] Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 8, at paragraphs 10 and 86. 
Available from    <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/1997/8.html> (last visited September 
2009).  
4 Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraph 86.      
5Bruce Moore, (ed), The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford University Press Australia and 
New Zealand (2003). 
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resolution7 and the role of institutions.8 The study of domestic governance systems is also 
important to the development of international law because good governance at the 
national level can enhance the effectiveness of international regimes.9  
 
This paper discusses governance issues relevant to environmental regulation of invasive 
alien species in a Federal system of government, using Australia as a case study. Invasive 
alien species (IAS) are alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species;10 
and countries are under international obligations to prevent the entry and establishment of 
these species.11 Yet, international law does not provide a full range of prescriptive rules 
for regulating IAS, leaving it up to individual countries to determine objectives and 
means for achieving outcomes.  
 
The discussion commences with an examination of what is meant by ‘governance’, 
emphasizing the importance of governance studies by helping regulators and other 
stakeholders appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of ‘collective decision-making’ 
within regimes.12 The paper then moves to a discussion of IAS and the obligations 
imposed on, and recommendations accepted by, countries that form part of the 
governance mechanisms for these species. 
 
Using this material, the paper undertakes a detailed analysis of Australia’s governance 
regime for regulating IAS. The analysis is structured in three stages: first, a description of 
Australia’s Federal system of government and how it operates in environmental 
regulation; second a description and analysis of the effectiveness of this system with 
reference to IAS; and third, identification of how governance arrangements applying to 
IAS might be improved, with a view to enhancing the IAS regime itself.13  
 
It is argued that, Australia has created a governance system for IAS largely based on 
political compromises, under the banner of ‘co-operative federalism’. The latter affords a 
way of structuring national regimes where, due to constitutional limitations, the Federal 
government lacks sufficient legislative powers to impose these regimes in its own right, 
as well as providing a forum for discussion, exchange of information and input into 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 
Palgrave Macmillan (2009) 93.   
7 Matthew Paterson, David Humphreys and David Pettiford, ‘Conceptualizing Global Environmental 
Governance: From Interstate Regimes to Counter-Hegemonic Struggles’, (2003) 3(2) Global 
Environmental Politics 1 at 3. 
8 Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 
above n 6, at 228.  
9 David Yencken, ‘Governance for Sustainability’, (2002) 61 (2) Australian Journal of Public  
dministration, 78, 84; Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-
Disciplinary Approach), above n 6, at 224.  
10 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, Article 8(h). The Convention was adopted 5 June 1992, [1993] 
ATS no 32 (entered into force 29 December 1993). The convention had 193 Parties as of March 2011. 
11 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, Article 8(h). 
12 Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 
above n 6, at 5.  
13 The structure of this analysis is based on the findings of Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, 
Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, above n 6, at 214-215.  
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policy. In establishing the IAS regime, the Federal government has adopted a supervisory 
role, effectively setting itself up as ‘meta-regulator’14 and meta-policy maker, at the head 
of a network of meta-governance.15 This stance presents the Federal government with the 
opportunity of providing a framework for coordinated national regulation of invasive 
alien species.16 However, the Federal government has only partially grasped that 
opportunity, leaving the regime peppered with gaps and inconsistencies that fall short of 




The word ‘governance’ has been described as a concept ‘characterised more by its 
widespread use than its clarity or singularity of meaning.’18 Undoubtedly, this evaluation 
results from the fluidity of the concept, which assumes different mantles according to 
context.19 Hence, the notion of governance varies across a range of disciplines, including 
corporate governance,20 global governance,21 environmental governance22 and global 
environmental governance.23 Notwithstanding this plethora of uses, governance has been 
                                                 
14 A meta-regulator is a regulator that regulates self-regulation. Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: 
Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy, Cambridge University Press (2002), Chapter 9.  
15 Michael Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford, Rod Griffith, ‘Multi-level 
Environmental Governance: Lessons from Australian Natural Resource Management’, (2009) 40 (2) 
Australian Geographer 169, at 170.  
16 Tony McCall, ‘Devolution in Embryo: the McArthur River Mine’ in K J Walker and K Crowley (eds) 
Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and Devolution, UNSW Press (1999) 103, 109. 
17 See discussion in: R J S Beeton, Kristal I Buckley, Gary J Jones, Denise Morgan, Russell E Reichelt and 
Denis Trewin, (2006) Australian State of the Environment Committee) 2006 Australia State of the 
Environment Independent Report to the Australian Government Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage, Department of the Environment and Heritage Canberra 2006 at paragraph 1.1; Elim Papadakis 
and Richard Grant, ‘The Politics of “Light Handed Regulation”: New Environmental Policy Instruments in 
Australia’, (2003) 12 (1) Environmental Politics, 27, at 31; Michael Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan 
Curtis, Elaine Stratford, Rod Griffith, ‘Multi-level Environmental Governance: Lessons from Australian 
Natural Resource Management’, above n 15, at 171. One area where the Federal government has retained 
comparatively tight control over regulation is with respect to border controls in quarantine regulation. 
Policy and risk assessment is carried out by Biosecurity Australia; while operational matters are undertaken 
by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS). See web site for Biosecurity Australia 
<http://www.daff.gov.au/ba> (last visited March 2011); and AQIS <http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis> (last 
visited March 2011). The legislative basis for Australia’s quarantine services are found in the Quarantine 
Act, 1908 (Cth). 
18 Charles Sampford, ‘Environmental Governance for Biodiversity’, (2002) 5 Environmental Science and 
Policy 79. 
19See for example, the discussion on governance in United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
‘Definition of Basic Concepts and Terminologies in Governance and Public Administration’ E/C.16/2006/4 
(2006) at page 3. 
20 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) The Journal of 
Finance 737. 
21 The Commission on Global Governance, Ingvar Darlsson and Shridath Ramphal (co-chairmen), Our 
Global Neighborhood: the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford University Press 
(1995). 
22 Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger K W Wurzel and Anthony R Zito, ‘”New” Instruments of Environmental 
Governance: Patterns and Pathways of Change’,  (2003) 12 (1) Environmental Politics 1, at 8.  
23Lamont C Hempel, Environmental Governance: the Global Challenge Island Press (1996). 
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succinctly defined as: ‘the structure and practice of decision making in an organization or 
society’.24  Governance can also be more elaborately described as: 
 
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests can be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes 
formal institutions, and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as 
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to 
be in their interest.25 
 
Specifically, with respect to the environment, governance is: 
 
… the resolution of environmental conflicts through the establishment, reaffirmation 
or change of institutional arrangements, which may either facilitate, or  limit, the use 
of environmental resources.26   
 
Two features of governance are conspicuous: the importance of ‘collective decision-
making’,27 and the role of institutions.28 With respect to the former, the literature on 
governance has identified a shift away from viewing governance as the sole domain of 
government29 and towards the projection of authority and administration to other 
stakeholders.30 Responsive regulation, for example, focuses on how best to guide conduct 
towards securing regulatory compliance31 with the “minimum level [of intervention] 
necessary’.32 Government, therefore, may set rules and the regulatory framework, but 
within that framework encourage self regulation. At the same time, effective governance 
calls for the establishment of mechanisms to monitor self-regulation in order to gauge the 
sufficiency of the system.  
 
                                                 
24 R Quentin Grafton, Linwood H Pendleton and Harry W Nelson (eds) A Dictionary of Environmental 
Economics, Science and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing USA (2001) at 119. 
25 The Commission on Global Governance, Ingvar Darlsson and Shridath Ramphal (co-chairmen), Our 
Global Neighborhood: the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, above n 21, at 2. 
26 Matthew Paterson, David Humphreys and David Pettiford, ‘Conceptualizing Global Environmental 
Governance: From Interstate Regimes to Counter-Hegemonic Struggles’, above n 7, at 3. 
27 Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 
above n 6, at 214-215.  
28 Ibid, at 19.  
29Colin Scott, ‘ Regulation in the Age of Governance: the Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’, in Jacint 
Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds) The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the 
Age of Governance’, CRC Series on Competition, Regulation and Development, (2004), 145, 145-146; 
Scott Burris, Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing, ‘Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship”, (2008) 41 Akron law Review 1, 12. 
30Scott Burris, Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing, ‘Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship”, above n 29, at 5. 
31Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford 
University Press (New York) (1992) at 4. John S F Wright and Brian Head, ‘Reconsidering Regulation and 
Governance Theory: A Learning Approach’, (2009) 33(2) Law and Policy , 197  at 198. 
32Colin Scott, ‘ Regulation in the Age of Governance: the Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’, in Jacint 
Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds) The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the 
Age of Governance’, CRC Series on Competition, Regulation and Development, (2004), above n 29, at 
145, 157, 167-168. 
 6 
Christine Parker has described the process of monitoring self-regulation as ‘meta-
regulation.’33 The notion has been used in contexts as diverse as corporate law34, analysis 
of the role of the European Commission in supervising compliance by member states,35 
and investigating the tension between community and commercial objectives in 
regulation.36 It can be used to describe hierarchical regulatory mechanisms spearheaded 
by government37 or regulation driven by community and market-place competition with 
government at the head of a ‘modest hierarchy”.38  
 
As used in this article, ‘meta-regulation’ draws on the concept developed by Parker – the 
notion of government acting in a supervisory capacity and monitoring those it supervises. 
The word, however, is not used identically to Parker’s formulation, because regulation of 
IAS in Australia is not based on a strictly hierarchical model. The regime is shaped by 
limitations stemming from the division of powers among the Federal, State and Territory 
governments which constrain the capacity of the Federal government to exercise 
‘official’ power to impose wholesale regulation for IAS across Australia. In addition, the 
IAS regime involves the activities of many stakeholders, such as landowners, farmers and 
local government, who operate at the state, regional and local levels. Consequently, it is 
not practicable for the Federal government to undertake an exhaustive range of regulation 
for IAS. Rather, the Federal government has accepted obligations under international law 
to deal with IAS and is ultimately answerable for that regulation, even though large 
portions of the regime come within the purview of State and Territory jurisdictions.39  
 
The second conspicuous feature of governance is the notion of ‘institutions’ – a concept 
capable of supporting a range of meanings. In a narrow sense, it comprises the laws, rules 
and regulations of a regime;40 while in a broader sense it extends to organizations and 
stakeholders. For the purposes of this paper, ‘institutions’ or ‘institution’ is used in the 
broader sense to include ‘formal and informal rules of behaviour, ways and means of 
enforcing these rules, procedures for mediation of conflicts, sanctions in the case of 
breach of the rules, and organizations’.41 The role of institutions is crucial to the 
                                                 
33 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy, above n 14, Chapter 
9.  
34Ibid.  
35 Colin Scott, ‘Regulating Everything’, UCD Geary Institute Discussion Paper Series (2008), 11-12, 27  
available <http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/images/Documents/RegEverything.pdf> (last visited March 2011). 
36 Colin Scott, ‘Regulating Everything’, UCD Geary Institute Discussion Paper Series Ibid; Bronwen 
Morgan, ‘The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial Legality’, (2003) 
12(4) Social & Legal Studies 489. 
37Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy, above n 14, Chapter 
9.  
38 Colin Scott, ‘Regulating Everything’, UCD Geary Institute Discussion Paper Series, above n 35, at 26-
28.  
39 The focus of this paper centres on the relationship among the Federal, State and Territory governments. 
Hence the discussion does not specifically delve into the role of regional governance, including local 
government. It is nevertheless acknowledged that parts of Australia’s IAS regime, such as weed control, are 
implemented at the regional level and these represent an important link in the fight against IAS. 
40 See generally D North (1994), ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, (1994) 84 American Economic 
Review, 359 – 368 where he evaluates the role of institutions through time. 
41 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2004: Exploring the Linkage Between the Domestic 
Policy Environment and International Trade, WTO (2004) at 176. Available from 
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operation of governance mechanisms because institutions provide the building blocks of 
regimes. Moreover, appropriate institutions furnish the implementation link between 
international agreements and domestic laws. Inadequate domestic governance 
arrangements, for example, can impair the ability of a country to meet its international 
obligations;42 potentially leading to ineffectual international agreements43 and a 
breakdown of international governance systems. 
 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this paper, governance studies, including those 
relating to IAS, centre on three key issues: analysing how lines of authority and power 
should be drawn; determining who should formulate policy, design rules and regulations; 
and deciding how regimes should be enforced.44 The key question posed by these issues 
is: ‘how should regimes be governed?’ In order to answer this question it is helpful to 




3. GOVERNANCE OF IAS – THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
 
The purpose of this part of the paper is not to analyse the international IAS regime per 
se.45 Rather, it is to pinpoint governance structures that countries need to establish in 
order to fulfil their international obligations and commitments with respect to IAS.  
 
Invasive alien species are alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species. 
The threats posed by IAS are numerous and include modifying habitat,46 introducing 
pests and diseases,47 reduction of biodiversity,48 and even extinction of species. 49 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report04_e.pdf> (last visited March 
2011).  
42 David Yencken, (2002) 61 (2) Australian Journal of Public Administration, 78, XX; Vasudha Chhotray 
and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, above n 6, at 224.  
43 Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 
above n 9, at 224.  
44 Ibid, at 228.  
45The author has previously undertaken an analysis of the international IAS regime, XXXXXXXX 
‘Invasive Alien Species and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Role of Quarantine Laws in Resolving 
Inadequacies in the International Legal Regime’ (2005) 17 (3) Journal of Environmental Law 323. 
46 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 
2010-2030, Australian Government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities, Canberra (2010), at 24-25. 
47 Clare Shine, Nattley Williams, and Lothar Gündling, A Guide to Designing Legal and Institutional 
Frameworks on Alien Invasive Species, IUCN Gland Switzerland Cambridge and Bonn (2000) at paragraph 
1.4. 
48 Carol M Brown, Tilapia and the Environment, 4 (2) TED CASE STUDIES, case no 208 (1995) available 
at <http://www.american.edu/TED/tilapia.htm> (last visited March 2011); E Grossman, Nile Perch and 
Lake Victoria Infestation Problem 4 (2) 2 TED CASE STUDIES, case no 206 (1995) available at 
<http://www.american.edu/TED/perch.htm> (last visited March 2011).  
49 Wittenberg (ed), An Inventory of Alien Species and Their Threat to Biodiversity and Economy in 
Switzerland. CABI Bioscience Switzerland Centre report to the Swiss Agency for Environment, Forests 
and Landscape (SAEFL, 2005) at 27; K Stokes, K O’Neill and R McDonald Invasive Species in Ireland 
Report to Environment and Heritage Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service by Quercus, Queens 
University (2004) at paragraph 1.6; Environment Protection Authority NSW, State of the Environment 
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IUCN has described the problem of invasive alien species as ‘one of the major threats to 
biological diversity’;50 while the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)51 has noted that the deleterious impacts of IAS are a 
significant cross-cutting issue for consideration by members.52  
 
At the international level, the governance of IAS comprises a diverse range of 
mechanisms. These span regional treaties applying to Europe,53 Asia,54 East Africa,55 
Central America56 and Antarctica; 57 to agreements dealing with the marine 
environment;58 to treaties protecting migratory species; and to global treaties such as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Report 1997, EPA NSW Government (1997), paragraph 2.6; Greg Sherley and Sarah Lowe, ‘Towards a 
regional invasive species strategy for the South Pacific: issues and options’ in G Sherley (ed) Invasive 
species in the Pacific: A Technical Review and Draft Regional Strategy SPREP Samoa (2000) 7-8. 
50 IUCN, Species Survival Commission, Guidelines for the Prevention of Biodiversity Loss Caused by 
Alien Invasive Species, of IUCN, (IUCN Guidelines) (2000), at paragraph 1.  
51 Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 10. 
52 Convention on Biological Diversity ‘Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species’ – 
Note by the Executive Secretary to the Conference of the Parties to the CBD/UNEP/CBD/COP/6/18 (18 
January 2002). 
53 1994 Protocol for the implementation of the Alpine Convention in the Field of Nature Protection and 
Landscape Conservation Chambery (Chambery Protocol), adopted 20 December 1994, available 
<http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;jsessionid=450637B9444BD183EEA4E53110C
D2E8E?id=TRE-001212&index=treaties> (last visited March 2011) (entered into force 18 December 
2002). As of March 2011 the protocol had 9 parties. 
54 1985 Asean Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Asean Agreement), 
adopted 9 June 1985, International Protection Of The Environment: Conservation in Sustainable 
Development, Wolfgang Burhenne and Nicholas Robinson (eds), (2) 1/A/9-7-85 (not yet in force – by 
virtue of Article 33, as the required 6 instruments of ratification have not yet been deposited). 
55 1985 Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Life Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African 
Region (East African Protocol), adopted 21 June 1985, International Protection Of The Environment: 
Conservation in Sustainable Development,  Wolfgang Burhenne and Nicholas Robinson (eds)  (2) 11/A/21-
06-85-b, 109 (entered into force 30 May 1996). As at September 2009 the Protocol had 10 parties. The 
convention was amended by the Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the 
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Western Indian Ocean adopted on 31 March 2010 (not yet in 
force). Available from 
<http://www.unep.org/NairobiConvention/The_Convention/Nairobi_Convention_Text/Amended_Text.asp
>  (last visited March 2011). 
56 1992 Convention for the Conservation of the Biodiversity and the Protection of Wilderness areas in 
Central America adopted 5 June 1992, text available via Ecolex 
<http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;jsessionid=C06F7662CD7FDEDE3656D09CD1
947D87?id=TRE-001162&index=treaties> (last visited March 2011) (entered into force on 20 December 
1994). As of March 2011 the Convention had 6 parties.  
57 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (Agreed Measures), Article IX 
reprinted in W M Bush  (ed) Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (1992) in Antarctica and 
International Law Volume 1 Oceana Publications (1992; Madrid Protocol, Articles 2, 3,  Annexes I and II. 
58 1995 Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of 
the Mediterranean, adopted 10 June 1995, (1999) Official Journal of the European Community L 322/3, 
Article 6(d) (entered into force 12 December 1999). As of March 2011 the protocol had 22 parties. The 
1995 Protocol replaced the 1982 Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Protected Areas (1982) to the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean; 
adopted 3 April 1982, (1982) Official Journal of the European Community 278/5, Article 7 (entered into 
force on 23 March 1986). As of the date it was replaced, the Protocol had 22 parties. Protocol for the 
Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the South-East Pacific (1989) to 
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Convention on Biological Diversity and United Nations Law of the Sea. 59 The IAS 
regime also includes international plant and animal protection treaties,60 international 
trade instruments61as well as non-binding guiding principles, 62 guidelines63 and codes of 
conduct.64 These instruments are supplemented by the activities of international 
organizations such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature or IUCN 65 
and the Global Invasive Species Programme.66 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, 
adopted 21 September 1989, text available via ecolex 
<http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;jsessionid=C06F7662CD7FDEDE3656D09CD1
947D87?id=TRE-001085&index=treaties> (last visited March 2011), Article VII (entered into force 24 
January 1995). As of March 2011 the Protocol had 5 parties; International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediment, Copy kindly provided by IMO Secretariat (Eileen 
Kee). Available by subscription from www.imo.org IMO Doc BWMCONF/36. The convention was 
adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on 13 February 2004. It will 
come into force 12 months after ratification by 30 States, representing 35 per cent of world merchant 
shipping tonnage. As of March 2011, 21 States representing 23% of the world’s merchant shipping tonnage 
had ratified the convention.  
59 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, adopted 10 December 1982, [1994] ATS 31 (entered into force 16 
November 1994). As of march 2011 the Convention had 161 parties. 
60 International Plant Protection Convention 1951 adopted on 6 December 1951, [1952] ATS No 5 
(entered into force 3 April 1952). Before the text of this convention was superseded, 127 governments had 
adhered to it. The convention was superseded by the International Plant Protection Convention 1997, 
adopted 17 November 1997, [2005] ATS No 23 (entered into force 2 October 2005). As of March 2011, the 
International Plant Protection Convention 1997 (IPPC) had 177 parties;  
61 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994, [1995] ATS 
No 8, 1 (entered into force 1 January 1995). As of March 2011 the WTO has 153 members. The Marrakesh 
Agreement consists of the agreement to set up the WTO and a number of annexures, including the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures that influences the design and 
implementation of national quarantine regimes. 
62 Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that 
Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species. Adopted April 2003 as part of Decision VI/23 of the Conference 
of the Parties. Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (23 September 2002).  
63 IUCN Guidelines for the Prevention of Biodiversity Loss Caused by Alien Invasive Species (IUCN 
Guidelines) (2000), above n 50. 
64 FAO, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries - Precautionary Approach to Capture 
Fisheries and Species Introductions (2), (1996). These guidelines are the second technical guidelines issued 
pursuant to the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995. The code was adopted at the 28th 
session of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on 31 October 1995 and is supported by 9 
Technical Guidelines and 4 Plans of Action, FAO, Rome, (1995). 
65 The IUCN was founded on 5 October 1948. It draws its membership from over 140 countries and 
currently has more than 10,000 acknowledged scientists and other experts who volunteer their services. The 
IUCN applies ecosystem management principles aligning both environmental and economic issues 
<http://www.iucn.org> (last visited March 2011). It maintains a Global Invasive Species Database listing 
100 of the world’s worst invasive species. 
66The Global Invasive Species Programme is an international organization formed in 1997 and which works 
closely with international organizations, such as, the IUCN, the secretariat of the CBD and scientific, 
research and conservations groups, such as CAB International, SCOPE and CSIRO to develop best 
practices to control IAS on a global scale.<www.gisp.org> (last visited March 2011). 
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The IAS regime has been criticized for being piecemeal and fragmented;67 however, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity endeavours to furnish a more unified and 
overarching framework for the protection of biodiversity,68 including protection from the 
deleterious impacts of IAS. In particular, Article 8(h) of the CBD requires the contracting 
parties to ‘prevent the introduction of or control or eradicate those alien species that 
threaten ecosystems, habitats or species’. Although this provision does not offer specific 
guidance for implementing obligations with respect to IAS, the Conference of the Parties 
to the CBD have adopted the CBD Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction 
and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems Habitats or Species 
(CBD Guiding Principles or Principles). 69  
 
The CBD Guiding Principles comprise 15 principles designed to enhance and harmonize 
domestic regimes with respect to IAS. The Principles are underpinned by the application 
of a three-tiered approach that emphasizes preventing introductions, followed by 
eradication, and then by control measures.70 The explanation accompanying the adoption 
of the CBD Guiding Principles71 envisages that members will establish appropriate 
institutional arrangements to support domestic IAS regimes,72 which should include 
adequate policies and laws as well as governance ‘mechanisms to coordinate national 
programmes’ at all levels of government.73 In addition, the Conference of the Parties of 
the CBD has reaffirmed the importance of biodiversity strategies and national action 
plans as a coordinating mechanism.74  Finally, members are encouraged to use the CBD 
Guiding Principles to review their policies, legislation and institutions, to identify gaps 
and inconsistencies with a view to making appropriate adjustments. 75  
 
From these recommendations, it is clear that members should consider at least two 
governance mechanisms as being crucial: the need to coordinate measures and the need 
to support regimes with adequate institutional arrangements. These elements are, of 
course, not unique to IAS regimes, but are encouraged in environmental regulation at 
large.76  
                                                 
67 Sophie Riley, ‘Invasive Alien Species and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Role of Quarantine Laws 
in Resolving Inadequacies in the International Legal Regime’ (2005) 17 (3) Journal of Environmental Law 
323 at 331-337. 
68 The CBD is a widely-accepted treaty, with a membership of 191 states (September 2009). A notable 
exception is the United States of America. However, with respect to the protection of biodiversity from 
IAS, the United States has established a National Invasive Species Council that provides a regulatory 
regime for the problem of IAS. See report of the council National Invasive Species Council Progress 
Report on the Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge: National Invasive Species Management Plan. FY 
2004 National Invasive Species Council (2005).  
69 Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that 
Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species, (CBD Guiding Principles), above n 62.   
70 CBD Guiding Principles, Ibid, Principle 2. 
71 CBD Guiding Principles, above n 62.  
72 Decision VI/23 of the Conference of the Parties. Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 62, at paragraph 10(b). 
73 Ibid, at paragraphs 10(b) and 10(f). 
74 Ibid, at paragraph 10. 
75 Ibid, at paragraph 10(c). 
76 For example, the World Summit on Sustainable Development considered it important that nations 
‘promote coherent and coordinated approaches to institutional frameworks….[and 
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The CBD Guiding Principles do not specify how countries are to realize these objectives. 
Shine, Williams and Gundling have pointed out that there are primarily three ways of 
doing so.77 The first way comprises a ‘unitary legislative framework’ where one piece of 
legislation deals with all IAS. 78 The second method involves the use of a coordinating 
body, with authority to harmonise objectives and processes across a range of 
stakeholders, including government departments and agencies that deal with IAS.79 The 
third possibility involves the use of a coordinating body that harmonises sufficient laws 
to ensure there are no conflicts between the sectors, but without the authority to impose 
harmonization of processes legally.80 
 
The first option is the most intrusive as it is based on legal control by a central 
government, which can override State and Territory parliaments. It requires a strong 
central government with skilled personnel and sufficient monetary resources to 
implement appropriate measures. The second choice, at least at first glance, appears less 
intrusive because the coordinating body is intended to administer harmonized measures, 
rather than promulgate measures which override State and Territory regulation. Such a 
system can make use of existing State and Territory processes and share expertise and 
implementation costs. Moreover, membership of any coordinating body can be widely 
drawn to include representatives from Federal, State and Territory levels. Accordingly, 
the coordinating body can accommodate a high degree of collaborative decision-making.  
 
However, the powers of the coordinating body are still predicated on legal control, 
sufficiently broad to impose regulation at all levels of government. As such, this option 
would still need to be supported by valid legislative underpinning, which in reality points 
to the exercise of overarching law-making powers by an institution of central 
government.81 The third choice, which is less directly intrusive than the first two, is based 
on political persuasion. It is dependent upon the willingness of a central government to 
establish mechanisms to coordinate IAS but without basing these on overriding 
legislative authority. It is argued that Australia’s IAS regime is developing in line with 
the third alternative but the regime lacks appropriate institutional support needed to 
achieve effective coordination.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
strengthen]…mechanisms necessary for policy-making and implementation and enforcement of laws.’ 
United Nations, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
A/CONF.165/14, chap.1 resolution 1, annex II, paragraph 162. Available from:  
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf> (last visited 
March 2011); see also the Commission on Global Governance, Ingvar Darlsson and Shridath Ramphal (co-
chairmen), Our Global Neighborhood: the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, above n 21, 
at 5. 
77 Clare Shine, Nattley Williams and Lothar Gundling, above n 47, at paragraph 4.3.4. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
81 In Australia, the absence of a legislative base for regulation can lead to complex constitutional problems, 
as witnessed by a series of High Court challenges to corporate law regulation in the 1990s. See generally, 
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; Bond v The Queen [2000] HCA 22. 
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4. FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE: AUSTRALIA AS A CASE 
STUDY 
 
4.1 Division of Law Making Powers 
As already noted, Australia is ruled by a Federal system of government established by the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp). In accordance with the 
Constitution, law-making powers are shared between the Federal, State and Territory 
parliaments.82 A small number of powers, largely those found in section 52, are 
exercisable exclusively by the Federal Parliament.83 However, the majority of powers 
available to the Federal government are those found in section 51 of the Constitution. 
These powers are technically exercisable concurrently by the State and Federal 
parliaments;84 although the High Court of Australia has interpreted many of these powers 
as falling within the exclusive domain of the Federal parliament.85 Any matters not 
referred to in the Australian constitution are known as the residual powers, which are 
exercisable solely by the States, and Territories.86  
Neither section 52 nor section 51 contains an express environmental power in favour of 
the Federal Parliament. Consequently, before the early 1980s it was presumed that the 
power to legislate for the environment comprised a residual power vested in the State and 
Territory parliaments.87 The 1983 High Court decision in Commonwealth v Tasmania88 
(Tasmanian Dam case) challenged this line of thought. This well-known case involved a 
dispute between the Federal government of Australia and the Tasmanian government 
regarding a dam the Tasmanian government wished to construct in an area that the 
Federal government had successfully nominated for World Heritage Listing.89 In the 
                                                 
82 Australia’s Federal system of government comprises: the Federal or Commonwealth government, the 
governments of the six states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and 
Western Australia) and the two territories (the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). 
83 Section 52 primarily deals with exclusive powers relating to the seat of government of the 
Commonwealth and places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes. 
84 These powers include quarantine under section 51(ix), census and statistics under section 51 (xi) and the 
external affairs under section 51(xxix). In situations of conflict between valid State and Federal laws, 
section 109 of the Constitution provides that State law gives way to the extent of the inconsistency; see 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
85 See generally discussion on interpretation of the Constitution and the scope of the external affairs power 
in Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory Federation Press 
(2006), at 325-374. 
86 The residual legislative power that the States have covers a wide range of matters including, health, 
education and the environment. 
87 Australian Senate, Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Committee 
Commonwealth Environment Powers, Commonwealth of Australia (1999) paragraphs 2.1-2.14 and 
paragraph 6.1. Available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/Committee/ecita_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-
02/enviropowers/report/c06.htm> (last visited March 2011). 
88Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; see discussion in Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden, 
‘Australian Environmental management: A “Dams” Story’, (2005) 28 UNSW Law Journal 668 at 668-675. 
89World Heritage Listing is undertaken in accordance with Article 11 of the1972 Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The Convention was adopted on 23 November 
 13 
ensuing litigation, the High Court held that the external affairs power in section 51(xxix) 
of the Constitution ‘authorizes a law which gives effect to an obligation imposed on 
Australia by a bona fide international convention or treaty to which Australia is a 
party’.90  
 
Although this finding uses broad, far-reaching language, it is also subject to a number of 
limitations that ensure the external affairs power is not read as endowing the Federal 
government with a carte blanche to legislate across the board for environmental 
matters.91 As Justice Dean noted in the same case, it is implicit that there ‘be a reasonable 
proportionality between the designated purpose or object and the means which the law 
embodies for achieving or procuring it.’92 Accordingly, key restrictions centre on the 
aims and purposes of international obligations and whether Australian law may 
realistically be considered conducive to those purposes.93 Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the growth of treaty-making, including environmental treaties, in the latter 
quarter of the twentieth century has widened the nature and scope of ‘external affairs’. 
This in turn has provided a broader base for underpinning the validity of legislation 
enacted pursuant to section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution.94 By the 1990s, this trend had 
helped re-shape the scope of Federal Parliament’s law making powers to cover a wide 
range of environmental matters.95  
 
For these reasons, outlining the nature and extent of the Federal Parliament’s role in 
environmental matters is fraught with complexity. Apart from legalities stemming from 
the division of powers in the Constitution, land and resource management has historically 
been a matter for determination by the States and Territories.96 Therefore, even if the 
Federal Government were to legislate for broad-scale environmental management, this 
regulation would intersect with pre-existing institutional arrangements established by the 
States and Territories.97 Consequently, any changes wrought by Federal Parliament 
would need to take these institutions into account.98 Indeed, the 1980s saw increasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
1972 [1975] ATS no 47 (entered into force 17 December 1975). The convention had 187 parties as of 
March 2011.  
90Commonwealth v Tasmania <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/21.html> Mason J, parag 
5 (last visited December 2010). 
91James Crawford, ‘the Constitution and the Environment’, (1991) 13 (1) Sydney Law Review 11, 21-24. 
92Commonwealth v Tasmania <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/21.html> Deane J, parag 
21(last visited December 2010). 
93Commonwealth v Tasmania <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/21.html> Brennan J, 
paragraph  54(last visited December 2010). 
94Melissa Castan, Sarah Joseph and David Wiseman, Federal Constitutional Law, Lawbook Co (2001), 98-
99.  
95 Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraphs 3-6, 18; James Crawford, ‘The Constitution and the 
Environment’, above n, 91; Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden, ‘Australian Environmental management: A 
“Dams” Story’, above n 88.  
96 Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths Australia (7th Edition 2010) at 
paragraph 5.50. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Australian Senate, Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Committee 
Commonwealth Environment Power, above n 79, at paragraph 6.1. 
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debate on how Federal, State and Territory Governments could create ‘mutually agreed 
institutional and policy-making mechanisms’ that took into account governance concerns 
stemming from each level of government.99 The pathway eventually chosen was a 
political one, designated ‘co-operative federalism’. 
 
4.2  Co-operative Federalism 
‘Co-operative federalism’ has been described as: 
 
the process by which the Commonwealth and the States organise for their 
overlapping constitutional powers to be exercised concurrently in order to 
achieve national outcomes through consensual processes.100  
 
In Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally,101  McHugh J pointed out that co-operative federalism 
is not a constitutional term, but a ‘political slogan’, describing an outcome reached by 
State and Federal governments operating within the powers conferred on each by their 
constitutions. 102 Essentially, it is an arrangement that enables the Federal government to 
establish national initiatives in areas where its legislative reach is curtailed by the 
Australian Constitution.  
 
The heart of co-operative federalism is found in the establishment of the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), which commenced in 1992. COAG is the peak inter-
governmental forum in Australia and its members consist of the Prime Minister, the 
Premiers of each of the six States, the Chief Ministers of the two Territories and the 
President of the Australian Local Government Association.103 COAG’s role is to develop 
and monitor the implementation of policy reforms that are of national significance and 
which require cooperative action by Australian governments. As such, COAG has a 
facilitative role, aimed at balancing the expectations of the differing levels of government 
and achieving integrated and efficient regulation.104 Matters of national significance are 
determined through a consultation process that includes correspondence amongst 
ministers, meetings of COAG, as well as separate meetings of senior officials.105 COAG 
                                                 
99 Ibid, at paragraph 6.2. 
100 James McConvill and Darryl Smith, ‘Interpretation and Cooperative Federalism Bond v R From a 
Constitutional Perspective’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 75, at 75. 
101 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
102 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, per McHugh at paragraph 54; see discussion George Williams, ‘Co-
operative Federalism and the Revival of the Corporations Law: Wakim and Beyond’,   (2002) 20 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 160, at 163. 
103For membership of COAG at the time of writing see 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag/coag_membership.cfm> (last visited March 2011). 
104 Elim Papadakis and Richard Grant, ‘The Politics of “Light Handed Regulation”: New Environmental 
Policy Instruments in  Australia’, above n 17, at 29-30; Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, 
‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The 
National environment Protection Council (Western Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3,  at paragraph 84. 
105 Communication with Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat dated 4 September 2009 (copy on file 
with author). 
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is assisted by a number of associated institutional arrangements106 that include 
Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils (Ministerial Councils), Intergovernmental 
Agreements and national strategies.107  
 
The Ministerial Councils develop policy reforms for consideration by COAG and also 
oversee the implementation of those reforms.108 Ministerial Councils are comprised of 
State and Federal ministers and at the time of writing there were over 40 Ministerial 
Councils overseeing a range of issues from International Trade to Local Government 
and Environmental Protection.109 Intergovernmental Agreements are negotiated 
amongst Federal, State and Territory governments and represent a political commitment 
on the part of each government to implement COAG decisions.110 There are numerous 
Inter-governmental Agreements111 covering matters such as food regulation,112 control of 
foot and mouth disease113 and regulation of the environment. With respect to the latter, 
two important agreements are the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment (the IGAE)114 and the 1997 by the Heads of Agreement on 
Commonwealth/State Roles and Responsibilities for the Environment 1997.115  
 
These instruments apportion and define the respective roles of the Federal and State 
governments. For example, the IGAE limits the role of the Federal government in 
                                                 
106See web site of the Council of Australian Governments 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag/index.cfm> (last visited March 2011 
107 Other institutions include specialist sub-committees. See Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia, 
above n 96, at paragraph 5.58. 
108See web site of the Council of Australian Governments 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/ministerial_councils/index.cfm> (last visited March 2011). 
109 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils 
Compendium Commonwealth Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (April 
2009). Available from <http://www.coag.gov.au/ministerial_councils/docs/compendium.pdf> (last 
visited Marc 2011). 
110See web site of the Council of Australian Governments  
<http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/index.cfm> (last visited March 2011). 
111Ibid. The vast number of these agreements is exemplified by the question on notice for the Minister 
Assisting the Minister for Climate Change, requesting information concerning the number of 
Intergovernmental Agreements with respect to climate change. The answer revealed that seven agreements 
were relevant. See  
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/2009-08-
12/0201/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf > (last visited March 2011). 
112 Intergovernmental Agreement on Food Regulation, July 2008, available from 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-07-03/docs/food_regulation_IGA.rtf > (last visited 
March 2011). 
113 Intergovernmental Agreement comprising a Memorandum of Understanding National Response to a 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Outbreak, December 2002, available from 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/docs/fmd_2002.cfm> (last visited March 2011). 
114 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) available from 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about/esd/publications/igae/index.html> (last visited March 2011), 
section 2; see discussion Stephen Dovers, ‘Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: 
Promises, Problems and Prospects’ in K J Walker and K Crowley (eds) Australian Environmental Policy 2: 
Studies in Decline and Devolution,  UNSW Press (1999) 204 at 209. 
115 The Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth/State Roles and Responsibilities for the Environment 1997, 
available from <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/coag-agreement/index.html> (last 
visited March 2011).  
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environmental matters to developing foreign policy and to facilitating cooperative 
development of national environmental standards in accordance with schedules attached 
to the Agreement.116 The schedules do not specifically apply to IAS, although Schedule 6 
does refer to the protection of biodiversity and the potential for the provisions of the CBD 
to traverse a wide range of Federal and State responsibilities. In 1996-1997, COAG 
commissioned a report to provide updated information on the most suitable role for the 
Federal government with respect to environmental matters.117 The outcome of this review 
was the COAG Heads of Agreement of November 1997, which further refined the roles 
and responsibilities of the Federal, State and Territory governments in environmental 
management.118 Henceforth, the latter was to be based on principles of co-operation, 
effectiveness and efficiency, with the responsibilities of the Federal government limited 
to reform in five key areas, including matters of National Environmental Significance and 
compliance with State environmental and planning legislation.119  
 
The Strategies which supplement the operation of Intergovernmental Agreements are 
developed under the auspices of COAG and are non-binding policy documents that are 
nevertheless expected to be implemented at all levels of government. Some 
environmentally-significant strategies include Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation 
Strategy 2010-2030 (Australia’s Biodiversity Strategy/Biodiversity Strategy)120 and the 
National Strategy for Energy Efficiency.121 The strategies are supplemented by 
committees122 and in some cases emergency response plans, such as the Australian 
Emergency Marine Pest Plan.123  
                                                 
116 See discussion Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council 
(Western Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraph 10; Tony McCall, ‘Devolution in Embryo: the 
McArthur River Mine’ in K J Walker and K Crowley (eds) Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in 
Decline and Devolution, above n 16, at 109-110. 
117 Intergovernmental Committee for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ICESD) Working Group on 
the Review of Commonwealth-State Roles and Responsibilities for the Environment, Consultation Paper, 
Canberra, December 1996. See discussion in James Prest and Susan Downing, Shades of Green? Proposals 
to Change Commonwealth Environmental Laws, Research Paper 16 1997-98, Law and Bills Digest Group 
23 June 1998. Available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp16.htm#BACK> (last 
visited March 2011).  
118 See discussion in Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden, ‘Australian Environmental management: A “Dams” 
Story’, above n 88, at 668-675.   
119 Heads of Agreement; see attachments 1-4 inclusive. The other three areas are; better delivery of national 
environmental programmes; environmental assessment and approval processes; listing, protection and 
management of heritage places.   
120. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 
2010-2030, above n 46. 
121 COAG, National Strategy on Energy Efficiency Commonwealth of Australia (2009). Available from 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2009-07-
02/docs/Energy_efficiency_measures_table.pdf > (last visited March 2011). 
122 See discussion surrounding footnote 128 of this paper. 
123 Natural Heritage Trust, Australian Emergency Marine Pest Plan (EMPPlan) (Control Centres 
Management Manual), Commonwealth Government of Australia  Working  Draft (May 2005). Available 
from:   
<http://www.marinepests.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/526283/EMPPlan_web_version_16_Oct_06_
2.pdf > (last visited March 2011). For a discussion on the protection of marine environment and the 
effectiveness of the national framework see Ian Peebles, ‘Towards A National Emergency Management 
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Regimes based on cooperative Federalism are beneficial in a number of respects 
including: improved capacity of integrating environmental matters into social and 
economic issues at the State and Territory levels;124 enhanced information sharing;125 and 
enhanced ‘administration of governmental powers’.126 COAG has proved a significant 
forum for achieving intergovernmental cooperation,127 particularly with respect to the 
development of policy.128 This is an important consideration for it can foster harmonious 
Federal-State relations and lead to the implementation of consistent regulatory 
regimes;129 something which has not always been easy to achieve within the framework 
of the power-sharing arrangements of the Australian Constitution.130 Yet, commentators 
have also criticized the ‘extra-parliamentary processes’ of co-operative federalism as an 
aberration and highlight deficiencies that can flow from inadequate leadership at the 
Federal level.131 In order to evaluate the level of effectiveness of co-operative federalism 
in the context of IAS, it is first necessary to say a few words with respect to the structure 
of Australia’s IAS regime.  
 
5. AUSTRALIA’S IAS REGIME 
 
Australia’s IAS regime comprises a tangle of laws, regulations and policies that traverse a 
range of environmental and natural resource systems. It is above all the product of two 
centuries of predominantly ad hoc responses to the problem of unwanted species. 
 
 
5.1. Federal Initiatives 
 
At the Commonwealth level, the Federal government has enacted two statutes directly 
relevant to IAS, the Quarantine Act, 1908 (Cth) (The Quarantine Act) and the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Framework For Marine Bio-Invasions’,  (2004) 19 (3) The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 
50. 
124 Michael Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford, Rod Griffith, ‘Multi-level 
Environmental Governance: Lessons from Australian Natural Resource Management’, above n 15, at 171. 
125 Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraph 10.      
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid at paragraph 7.  
128 Elim Papadakis and Richard Grant, ‘The Politics of “Light Handed Regulation”: New Environmental 
Policy Instruments in Australia’, above n 17, at 30. 
129 Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraph 10.      
130 Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden, ‘Australian Environmental management: A “Dams” Story’, above n 
88, at 668-675; Geoff Leane, Gary D Meyers and Sonia Potter, ‘Promise or Pretence – Compliance with the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment: The National environment Protection Council (Western 
Australia) Act 1996’, above n 3, at paragraph 84.     
131 Stephen Dovers, ‘Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: Promises, Problems and 
Prospects’ in K J Walker and K Crowley (eds) Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and 
Devolution,  above n 114 at 216. 
 18 
The Quarantine Act plays a ‘critical role in protecting Australia from exotic diseases and 
pests’.132 As such, the act is important in preventing or controlling the introduction of 
IAS, including those that impact upon the environment.133 The Quarantine Act is also 
supported by regulations and proclamations.134 Of particular importance is Quarantine 
Proclamation 1998135 that prohibits the entry into Australia of animals, plants and their 
products unless they are on an authorized list, or they have been assessed and a permit 
has been granted for their importation.136 Australia has pioneered a process known as the 
Weed Risk Assessment (WRA)137 which is designed to identify potential plant IAS.138 
Analogous processes are also being formulated for animals, although these are proving 
more challenging.139  
 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), 
was designed to fulfil Australia’s international obligations under various international 
instruments, including the Convention on Biological Diversity. With respect to IAS, 
section 183 of the EPBC Act stipulates that the deleterious impacts of IAS may be listed 
as a ‘key threatening process’.140 Application needs to be made to the Threatened Species 
                                                 
132 Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine v Australian Pork Limited [2005] FCAFC 206 at paragraph 
100 per Branson J.  
133 Quarantine Act, 1908 (Cth), section 4(b). References to the environment were added to the Quarantine 
Act after the Nairn Report recommended that the scope of quarantine should be extended to the natural 
environment. See M E Nairn, P G Allen, A R Inglis and C Tanner, Australian Quarantine: A Shared 
Responsibility above n 206 at paragraph 2.2.4. 
134 See for example, Quarantine Regulations 2000, Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth); for proclamations, see 
Quarantine Proclamation 1998 (as amended). 
135 The 1998 Proclamation is available from:  
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/legislativeinstrumentcompilation1.nsf/current/bytitle/AE3
8C4F883931ACECA256FC60003F7DB?OpenDocument&mostrecent=1> (March 2011).  
136 Essentially, only plant seeds listed in Schedule 5 of Quarantine Proclamation are permitted entry. All 
other importation of plant and animal products must undergo a risk assessment.  
137 DAFF, Fact Sheet on the Weed Risk Assessment System 
<http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/reviews/weeds/system/weed_risk_assessment > (last visited March 2011).  
138 DAFF, Fact Sheet on the Weed Risk Assessment System,. The Weed Risk Assessment is also being 
used by other states, such as Ecuador. H Rogg, C Buddenhagen and C Causton, ‘Experiences and 
Limitations with Pest Risk Analysis in the Galapagos Islands’ in Identification of Risks and Management of 
Invasive Alien Species Using the IPPC Framework, Proceedings of a workshop in Braunschweig, Germany 
22-26 September 2003, Secretariat of the IPPC FAO (2005) 120. The authors also note that the WRA has 
limitations because it does not assess pathways of introduction of alien species. 
139 See generally, Mary Bomford, Risk Assessment for the Import and Keeping of Exotic Vertebrates in 
Australia, Bureau of Rural Sciences Canberra, Australia (2003); South Australian Pest Animal Risk 
Assessment developed by the Biosecurity Unit of the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity of South 
Australia. Media release available from 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/biosecuritysa/nrm_biosecurity/pest_animal/sa_pest_animal_risk_assessment> 
(last visited March 2011); Mary Bomford, Risk Assessment Models for Establishment of Exotic Vertebrates 
in Australia and New Zealand, Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre, Bureau of Rural Sciences 
Canberra, Australia (2008). 
140 A “key threatening process” is a threatening process that further endangers a listed threatened species, or 
ecological community, or adversely affects two or more listed threatened species, or ecological 
communities (EPBC Act, section 528 Definitions and section 188(4). A ‘threatening process” is defined as 
one that threatens the survival, abundance, or evolutionary development of a native species or ecological 
community, (EPBC Act, section 528 Definitions and section 188(3) ). 
 19 
Scientific Committee,141 which recommends whether or not the process should be listed. 
If the process is listed, then the Minister must prepare a threat-abatement plan to alleviate 
the threat, but only if the Minister considers that a threat-abatement plan is a ‘feasible, 
effective and efficient way to abate the process’.142 A number of key threatening 
processes directly related to IAS have already been accepted for listing including: 
predation, competition and land degradation by rabbits, un-managed goats, feral pigs, red 
foxes, feral cats, rats, as well as loss of biodiversity caused by the yellow crazy ant, cane 
toads and the red fire ant. 143   
 
In addition to the Quarantine Act and the EPBC Act, a number of Ministerial Councils 
and Intergovernmental Agreements also touch upon the problem of IAS, although no 
single Ministerial Council or Intergovernmental Agreement directly targets these species. 
Relevant Ministerial Councils include: the Cultural Ministers Council, the Ministerial 
Council on Energy, the Environment Protection and Heritage Council, the Gene 
Technology Ministerial Council, the Ministerial Council on International Trade, the 
Local Government and Planning Ministers’ Council, the Natural Resource Management 
Ministerial Council, the Primary Industries Ministerial Council, the Regional 
Development Council, the Sport and Recreation Ministers’ Council and the Australian 
Transport Council. 144   
 
While no dedicated Intergovernmental Agreement tackles IAS, Agreements have been 
negotiated that deal with particular aspects of the IAS problem such as foot and mouth 
disease145 and marine pests. With respect to the latter, the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on a National System for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pest Incursions146 
deals with IAS of the marine environment. The Agreement provides for cooperative 
efforts,147 consistency of measures and the establishment of a National Standing 
Committee to coordinate measures.148 In a similar vein, the Federal, State and Territory 
governments have negotiated a draft Intergovernmental Agreement for improving 
                                                 
141EPBC Act sections 502 and 503 establish the Threatened Species Scientific Committee.  
142EPBC Act section 270A. 
143 Department of Sustainability Environment, Population and Communities, Listed Key Threatening 
Processes. Available   <http://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/sprat/public/publicgetkeythreats.pl> (last 
visited March 2011).  
144 COAG, Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils Compendium, above n 109. 
145 Commonwealth of Australia, State of New South Wales, State of Victoria, State of Queensland,  State of 
Western Australia, State of South Australia, State of Tasmania, Northern Territory of Australia and 
Australian Capital Territory, Memorandum of Understanding National Response to a Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) Outbreak – 2002. Available from 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/docs/fmd_2002.pdf > (last visited March 2011).  
146 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pest 
Incursions, available from    
<http://www.marinepests.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/772864/Marine_IGA.pdf > (last visited 
March 2011); see also associated plan for rapid response, the Australian Emergency Marine Pest Plan, 
above n 123.  
147 Marine IGA, above n 146, Preamble, paragraph C; paragraphs 7.2 and 10. 
148 Marine IGA, above n 146, paragraph 8. 
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Australia’s Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment149 (the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Improving Biosecurity).150 At the time of writing, the 
agreement had been drafted and endorsed by the Natural Resource Management Ministerial 
Council for attention by COAG, but had not yet been adopted.151 
 
The draft Intergovernmental Agreement for Improving Biosecurity is designed to 
supplement Australia’s Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment 
(AusBIOSEC). AusBIOSEC was established in 2005 within the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). It oversees biosecurity with respect to 
primary production and the environment by drawing together government, industry, 
landholders and the public.152  Although AusBIOSEC has been operative since 2005, the 
aim of the draft Intergovernmental Agreement is to extend Australia’s existing 
biosecurity arrangements to those species that ‘impact on the environment and social 
amenity’. The plan has the potential to create an overarching strategy that draws together 
regulation of invasive animals, plants and diseases.153  
 
The Intergovernmental Agreements link closely to national strategies, plans and systems 
which are the means by which the political arrangements in the Intergovernmental 
Agreements are implemented. National strategies are drafted with the support of 
Ministerial Councils, approved by COAG and channel into State and Territory 
strategies.154 The Federal government has developed a number of important strategies 
and plans that relate to IAS, including the Australian Weeds Strategy – A National 
Strategy for Weed Management in Australia (Australian Weeds Strategy),155 the 
Australian Pest Animal Strategy – A National Strategy for the Management of Vertebrate 
Pest Animals in Australia (Australian Pest Animal Strategy);156 the Australian 
                                                 
149 Primary Industries and Natural Resources Management Ministerial Councils, Communiquė 18 April 
208, available from <http://www.mincos.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/629523/nrmmc-13.pdf > (last 
visited March 2011) at page 2.  
150 Australia’s Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment (AusBIOSEC), See also 
definition of biosecurity by AusBIOSEC as ‘the protection of the economy, environment and public health 
from negative impacts associated with pests, diseases and weeds.’  
151. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, ‘Communiqué’, NRMC 17, 23 April, 2010. 
Available from <http://www.mincos.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1608911/nrmmc17.pdf > (last 
visited January 2011). 
152 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Pest Animal Strategy – A National 
Strategy for the Management of Vertebrate Pest Animals in Australia,  Australian Government, Department 
of the Environment and Water Resources, Canberra ACT (2006) at (i), Commonwealth of Australia (2007).  
Available at <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/publications/pubs/pest-animal-
strategy.pdf > (last visited March 2011). 
153 Allen Grant, ‘The Australian Biosecurity System’, Bureau of Rural Sciences Seminar, 4 August 2006, 
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Available from 
<http://adl.brs.gov.au/brsShop/data/seminar_4_august_2006.pdf > at 11 (last visited March 2011). 
154 Tony McCall, ‘Devolution in Embryo: the McArthur River Mine’ in K J Walker and K Crowley (eds) 
Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and Devolution, above n 16, at 109. 
155 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Weeds Strategy – A National Strategy 
for Weed Management in Australia, (Australian Weeds Strategy) Australian Government, Department of 
the Environment and Water Resources, Canberra ACT (2006). Available from 
<http://www.weeds.gov.au/publications/strategies/pubs/weed-strategy.pdf> (last visited March 2011). 
156 Australian Pest Animal Strategy, above n 152.  
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Emergency Marine Pest Plan;157and Australia’s Biodiversity Strategy/Biodiversity 
Strategy). 
The Australian Weeds Strategy provides guidance for consistent management of weeds in 
Australia at all levels.158 It is supported by the Australian Weeds Committee, which 
develops policy with respect to control and management of weeds.159 The Australian Pest 
Animal Strategy is a strategy for an integrated approach to the management of pest 
animals in Australia. The role of the Federal government is to provide leadership, to 
coordinate stakeholders and to raise public awareness of ‘pest animals of national 
significance’.160 In addition, the Federal government aims to ensure the implementation 
of ‘nationally consistent pest animal management approaches’ and to ‘improve the 
consistency and effectiveness of pest animal management legislation across Australia.’ 161 
The strategy is supported by the Vertebrate Pests Committee,162 which, in similarity with 
the Australian Weeds Committee, provides policy and planning support on a range of 
issues dealing with pest animals. In the context of the marine environment, the Australian 
Emergency Marine Pest Plan163 specifies responsibilities and actions to control and 
eradicate marine pests ‘before they establish large populations.’ The plan is supported by 
the Consultative Committee on Introduced Marine Pest Emergencies (CCIMPE) which 
coordinates emergency responses.164 The newly-released Biodiversity Strategy notes that 
procedures such as the Australian Weeds Strategy and the Australian Pest Animal 
Strategy are pivotal to dealing with IAS. 165 
Other initiatives instigated by the Federal Government include the Natural Heritage Trust 
and its successor, Caring for Country. The Natural Heritage Trust operated during the 
years 1997-2008, and was established from funds garnered from the partial privatization 
of Telstra Corporation Ltd.166 The trust provided funding at the national, regional and 
local levels for projects designed to protect Australia’s biodiversity and build community 
capacity and engagement. The eradication and control of invasive species figured 
prominently in the activities of the trust. For example, the National Feral Animal Control 
Program (now Australian Pest Animal Management Program) was established under the 
                                                 
157 Natural Heritage Trust, Australian Emergency Marine Pest Plan (EMPPlan), above n 123.  This strategy 
was drafted under the auspices of the Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture and the 
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council. 
158 Australian Weeds Strategy, above n 155, part 3 ‘Managing the weed problem – roles and 
responsibilities’. 
159 See web site of the Australian Weeds Committee at <http://www.weeds.org.au/awc.htm> (last visited 
March 2011). 
160 Australian Pest Animal Strategy, above n 152, at  paragraph 1.6 at page 4. 
161 Ibid, at  paragraph 1.2, page 8. 
162 See web site of the Vertebrate Pests Committee, < http://www.feral.org.au/policy/vpc/ > (last visited 
March 2011). 
163 Natural Heritage Trust, Australian Emergency Marine Pest Plan (EMPPlan), above n 123.  
164 See web site of the National System for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pest Incursions 
<http://www.marinepests.gov.au/national_system/how-it-works/emergency_management> (last visited 
March 2011), at 24-25.  
165. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 
2010-2030, above n 46. 
166Natural Trust Heritage Act 1997 (Cth), sections 8 and 22-29. 
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auspices of the trust. The trust also awarded funds for state programs, such as the 
eradication of feral pigs.167 
The objectives of the Caring for Country initiative are similar to the Natural Heritage 
Trust. Both concentrate on funding for environmental management of Australia’s natural 
resources and protection of the environment at large.168 In 2009-10 the program provided 
more than $403 million for environmental and sustainable farming projects.169 Caring for 
Country continues to finance projects dealing with IAS, such as the $19 million grant 
provided to reduce the density of feral camels in remote Australia.170 The program also 
supports an array of smaller community and government projects including $599, 615 
awarded to the Southern Regional Natural Resource management Association (Tasmania) 
to minimize the spread of terrestrial and freshwater pests and pathogens in the Tasmanian 
Wilderness World Heritage Area; 171 and $595 000 granted to the North East Catchment 
Management Authority of Victoria to deal with the threats posed by invasive plants and 
animals in the Lower Ovens River.172   
 
Australia believes that its governance arrangements comprising legislation, strategies, 
agreements and plans have not weakened the effectiveness of its IAS regime. 173 This is 
reflected in Australia’s 2006 and 2009 country reports lodged with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity that indicate Australia is committed to managing the problem of 
IAS. More specifically, in its 2006 country report,174 Australia considered the following 
activities as significant to fulfilling its obligations under article 8(h): listing the effects of 
IAS as threatening processes under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act, 1999 (Cth);175 the incorporation of IAS provisions in the National 
Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity176 and the National 
                                                 
167Laure Twigg, Tim Lowe and Gary Martin, Feral Pigs and 1080 Baiting – what you need to know, 
PestNote 197, Department of Agriculture and Food, Vertebrate Pest Research Section, (December 2006), 4. 
Available from <http://www.agric.wa.gov.au/objtwr/imported_assets/content/pw/vp/fer/fpigtext.pdf> (last 
visited March 2011). 
168 See web site ‘Caring for Country’ <http://www.nrm.gov.au/>  (last visited March 2011). 
169 Caring for Country, Funded Projects, available from <http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/index.html> (last 
visited Marc 2011). 
170 Caring for Country, Business plan 2009-2010, Competitive Process Successful Projects, available from 
<http://www.nrm.gov.au/business-plan/funded/09/competitive/index.html> (last visited March 2011). 
171 Caring for Country, Business plan 2009-2010, Business Plan Projects Funded Through the Open Call 
Process, available from <http://www.nrm.gov.au/business-plan/funded/10/open/success-tas.html> (last 
visited March 2011). 
172 Caring for Country, Business plan 2009-2010, Business Plan Projects Funded Through the Open Call 
Process, available from <http://www.nrm.gov.au/business-plan/funded/10/open/success-vic.html> (last 
visited March 2011). 
173 Australian Government, Australia’s Fourth National Report to the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity, March 2009 at page 79.  
174 Australia, Third National Report  to the Convention on Biological Diversity 2006, 127-134. 
175 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Cth), section 183. 
176 At the time of the report to the CBD, the following strategy: Department of the Environment and Water 
Resources, National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity 1996. Available 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/index.html> (Last visited March 2011).  
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Weeds Strategy (now the Australian Weed Strategy).177 Although Australia’s 
commitment to dealing with the problem of IAS is reflected in its policies and 
instruments, Australia’s Fourth National Report lodged in 2009,178 still identified the 
deleterious impacts of IAS as a continuing and major threat to the country’s 
biodiversity.179  
 
The report also conceded that while Australia has made good progress towards 
implementing management plans for specific IAS, there is insufficient coordination of 
activities.180 This is particularly the case with respect to collection and synthesis of 
data.181 Australia highlighted that it proposes enhancing management of IAS by 
techniques that include harnessing the potential of AusBIOSEC to use quarantine 
measures for protection of the environment at large.182 It is also telling that Australia’s 
Fourth National Report acknowledged that the states and territories lack adequate 
regulation with some aspects of their IAS regimes, including monitoring and 
management of IAS.183  
 
 
5.2  The States and Territories 
 
In similarity to the Federal government, the States and Territories also rely on a mix of 
legislative and policy instruments to deal with IAS, each instrument largely managing a 
specific aspect of the IAS problem.  
 
To start with, all States and Territories have enacted legislation to eradicate or control 
declared ‘pest’ animals or weeds.184 Section 174 of the Natural Resources Management 
Act 2004 (SA), for example, authorizes the Minister for the Environment and 
Conservation to compile lists of pest animals and problem plants as a precursor to 
requiring land owners to control these species A proposed amendment to the legislation 
will extend obligations to those who have a pest animal in their possession or control.185 
                                                 
177 Weeds Australia, the National Weeds Strategy, is available from <http://www.weeds.org.au/> (March 
2011).  
178 Australian Government, Australia’s Fourth National Report to the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity, above n 173. 
179 Ibid, at pages 4, 12 and 79-81. 
180 Ibid, at page 103. 
181 Ibid, at 103. 
182 Ibid, at 79-81. 
183 Australian Government, Australia’s Fourth National Report to the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity, above n 173, at pages 8-9 referring to the Northern Territory.  
184 In addition to the legislation discussed in this part of the paper, see also Agriculture and Related 
Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA), Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (Vic), Plant Quarantine 
Act 1997 (Tas), Weeds Management Act 2001 (NT).  
185South Australia, Natural Resources Management (Review) Amendment Bill 2010 (An Act to amend the 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004). Available from 
<http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/dwlbc/assets/files/NRM_Review_Amendment_Bill_2010.pdf> (last 
visited March 2011). 
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The current list of pest species includes notorious IAS, such as the European rabbit186 and 
the Red Fox.187  Elsewhere, the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 
2002 (Qld), the Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA) and the 
Pest Plant and Animals Act 2005 (ACT) contain similar measures to the Natural 
Resources Management Act 2004 (SA): the establishment of lists of declared pests;188 
and the creation of a series of offences for matters such as failing to notify the presence 
of a pest, failing to control the pest, or releasing and/or keeping the pest.189  
In New South Wales, comparable procedures apply with respect to plants under the 
Noxious Weeds Act 1993 (NSW), and to animals under the Rural Lands Protection Act 
1998 (NSW). As with other jurisdictions, New South Wales legislation is also predicated 
on the declaration of lists of noxious or pest species. In accordance with sections 7 and 33 
of the Noxious Weeds Act, the Minister for Primary Industries may declare plants as 
noxious weeds; while pursuant to section 143 of the Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 the 
Minister may declare any member of the animal kingdom, including insects, reptiles, 
molluscs and crustaceans to be a pest. Once these declarations have been made, control 
orders are issued to the occupier of land, and in the case of the Rural Lands Protection 
Act 1998 the owner of land as well.190 
To supplement legislation based on declared lists, the States and Territories have also 
enacted quarantine regulation to stop the introduction and spread of diseases and 
pathogens of plants and animals. 191 The Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) for example, 
provides for the quarantine of land which is infected by a disease or pest,192 and the 
destruction of abandoned orchards or nurseries. 193 In the Northern Territory, the Plant 
Diseases Control Act 1979 (NT) similarly provides for the declaration of quarantine areas 
of pests of plants; 194 while the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 
2002 (Qld) directly targets pest management of plants and animals on stock routes.195  
 
With regard to the natural environment, in similarity to the Federal government, the 
States and Territories have established legislative and policy instruments to protect 
                                                 
186Natural Resources Management Act, 2004, Declaration of Animals and Plants, Class 9, mammals. 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/137460/Declaration_of_Animals_and_Plants.pdf> 
(last visited March 2011). 
187Natural Resources Management Act, 2004, Declaration of Animals and Plants, Class 7, mammals. 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/137460/Declaration_of_Animals_and_Plants.pdf> 
(last visited March 2011). 
188Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 2002 (Qld), sections 36-38; the Agriculture 
and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA), sections 35-37; and the Pest Plant and Animals Act 
2005 (ACT), section 16. 
189Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 2002 (Qld), sections 39-46; the Agriculture 
and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA), sections 43, 50 and 51;and the Pest Plant and Animals 
Act 2005 (ACT), sections 9, 18 and 22. 
190 Noxious Weeds Act 1993 (NSW), sections 7, 12 and 33; Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 (NSW), 
section 155. 
191 See also Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), section 187. 
192 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW), section 8. 
193 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW), section 21. 
194Plant Diseases Control Act 1979 (NT), sections 10 and 11. 
195Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 2002 (Qld), section 3. 
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threatened species and ecological communities from the deleterious impacts of IAS. In 
New South Wales, sections 8 and 13 of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 
(NSW) provide that IAS may be listed as key threatening processes,196 after which the 
Director-General of the Department of the Environment, Climate Change and Water may 
prepare a threat-abatement plan.197 Comparable provisions for listing and preparation of 
action plans are also found in the Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act (1988) (Vic) 198 and 
the Nature Conservation Act (1980) (ACT). 199 
 
However, not all Australian States afford a legislative base for listing of threatening 
processes. In Queensland, for example, the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) specifies 
that national parks and certain species, such as prohibited wildlife,200 are to be managed 
in accordance with principles that take into account threatening processes, including 
threats presented by other wildlife.201 The legislation, however, stops short of providing 
for listing of threatening processes. Instead, these are dealt with through policy 
approaches that can be located on the web site of the Queensland Department of 
Environment Resource Management.202 In Western Australia, the Wildlife Conservation 
Act 1950 neither mentions IAS, nor contemplates the listing of threatening processes.203 
Although section 17(2)(f) does prohibit a person from bringing into, or keeping an animal 
in Western Australia that might become or threaten to become injurious to fauna or flora. 
As with Queensland, Western Australia has also issued a number of policy documents; in 
Western Australia’s case under the umbrella of ‘Wildlife Management Programs (and 
Recovery Plans)’;204 these support listing of threatening processes that would extend to 
threats posed by IAS, such as weeds and feral animals.205 
                                                 
196 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), sections 8 and 13; for processes listed, see web site 
NSW Department of the Environment and Conservation,   
<http://www.threatenedspecies.environment.nsw.gov.au/tsprofile/home_threats.aspx> (last visited March 
2011). 
197Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), section 74. 
198 Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act (1988) (Vic), sections 11(3) and 19. 
199 Nature Conservation Act (1980) (ACT), sections 35, 38 and 40-42. 
200 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), section 82 defines prohibited wildlife as ‘an unnatural hybrid or 
not indigenous to Australia’ and that is likely to ‘constitute a threatening process to protected wildlife. 
201Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), for example, section 16(2)(b) Management of National Parks and 
section 73A(iii) Management of wildlife and section 75(b) Management Principles of Prohibited Wildlife. 
Threatening processes are defined in section 12 to include processes that threaten the survival of any 
protected area, protected wildlife or wildlife habitat that affects the capacity of the habitat to sustain natural 
processes. 
202Queensland Department of Environment Resource Management, ‘Threats to Wildlife’; available from: 
<http://www.epa.qld.gov.au/nature_conservation/wildlife/threats_to_wildlife/index.html>, (last visited 
March 2011). 
203 Colin Murphy, Western Australia Auditor General’s Report, Rich and Rare: Conservation of Threatened 
Species. Report 5 – June 2009 at 13-16 
<http://www.audit.wa.gov.au/reports/pdfreports/report2009_05.pdf>  (last visited March 2011).   
204 Available from the web site of the Western Australian Department of the Environment and 
Conservation, <http://www.dec.wa.gov.au/management-and-protection/threatened-species/policies.html> 
(last visited March 2011).  Other policy documents include the ‘Conservation of Threatened Flora in the 
Wild’ and ‘Conservation of Endangered and Specially Protected Fauna in the Wild’. 
205See discussion in David J Coates and Kenneth A Atkins’ Priority Setting and the Conservation of 
Western Australia’s Diverse and Highly Endemic Flora’, (2001) 97 (2) Biological Conservation 251 at 
259-260.  
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The State of Tasmania also does not provide a legislative base for listing of threatening 
processes. While sections 13-21 of the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (Tas) set 
out how threatened flora and fauna may be listed, no comparable provision is found for 
listing of threatening processes. Rather, a reference to invasive species is found in a 
Tasmanian policy statement, the ‘Threatened Species Strategy for Tasmania’.206 The 
strategy specifically refers to pests, weeds and diseases as threatening processes,207 which 
are identified and then taken into account in accordance with section 27(2)(b) of the 
Threatened Species Protection Act 1995. The latter anticipates that threat-abatement 
plans may be prepared for identified threatening processes.  
 
The States and Territories have also adopted a range of strategies and plans dealing with 
particular types of IAS, such as weeds,208 or to address specific aspects of IAS regulation, 
such as biosecurity or monitoring.209 New South Wales,210 for example, has developed a 
dedicated IAS plan, while other states211 and some local and regional areas, are also 
developing IAS strategies.212 The NSW plan is designed to be implemented over 8 years 
and is supported by four key goals that target: preventing the establishment of new IAS; 
controlling and eradicating new IAS; reducing the impacts of significant IAS; and 
capacity building.213 The plan applies to government and landowner alike and when fully 
functional, has the potential to achieve a comprehensive and coordinated system for 
managing IAS in New South Wales. Yet, as noted in the plan itself, regulators still face 
many challenges, including: coordinating stakeholders who may not all share common 
                                                 
206Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, Threatened Species Unit, Nature 
Conservation Branch, Threatened Species Strategy 2000 Department of Primary Industries, Water and 
Environment (2000) Hobart at pages 11-13. Available from 
<http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/Attachments/RLIG-542642/$FILE/threatspstrat.pdf> (last visited 
March 2011). 
207Ibid at pages 11-13); An example of a threat abatement plan that refers to IAS is the Threatened 
Tasmanian Orchids Flora Recovery Plan 2006-2010 prepared by the Department of Primary Industries, 
Water and Environment, Hobart (2006) which at page 20 discusses weed invasions. 
208 Land Protection, Department of Natural Resources and Mines Queensland Weeds Strategy 2002-2006 
(currently under review) 
<http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/documents/Biosecurity_EnvironmentalPests/IPA-QLD-Weed-Strategy.pdf > 
(last visited March 2011). 
209 Jan-Willem De Milliano, Andrew Woolnoug, Andrew Reeves, and Damian Shepherd, Ecologically 
significant invasive species: A monitoring framework for natural resource management groups in Western 
Australia, Prepared for the Natural Heritage Trust 2 program, Department of Agriculture and Food, 
Western Australia, South Perth. Available from 
<http://www.agric.wa.gov.au/objtwr/imported_assets/content/pw/vp/rcm_esis_monitoring_framework.pdf> 
(last visited March 2011); Department of Primary Industries and Water, Tasmanian Biosecurity Committee, 
Tasmanian Biosecurity Strategy, (2006) page 14 parag 1.6  where the strategy refers to the development of 
consistent policies and plans for preparing and responding to pests, diseases and weed incursions.  
210 New South Wales Government, Department of Primary Industries, ‘New South Wales Invasive Species 
Plan 2008-2015’, New South Wales Government, Department of Primary Industries (2008). 
211 See for example, the State of Victoria, Department of Primary Industries, ‘Invasive Plants and Animals, 
Policy Framework’, Department of Primary Industries, (2010). 
212 See for example Brisbane City Council, ‘Brisbane Invasive Species Management Plan July 2007-June 
2011’; available from <http://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/environment-waste/plans-projects/brisbane-
invasive-species-management-plan/index.htm > (last visited March 2011). 
213 New South Wales Government, Department of Primary Industries, ‘New South Wales Invasive Species 
Plan 2008-2015’, New South Wales Government, Department of Primary Industries (2008), 1-4. 
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goals;214 establishing an appropriate legislative base with respect to enforcement 
mechanisms;215 and the complexities of operating against the backdrop of nationally 
inconsistent laws and policies.216 This last point ushers this discussion towards an 
evaluation of Australia’s IAS regime; for, notwithstanding the impressive array of 
legislative and policy instruments just discussed, there is room for much improvement.  
 
 
6. GAPS AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE REGIME 
 
The increase in government activity leading to the conclusion of a range of legislative 
and policy instruments touching upon and dealing with IAS demonstrates a heightened 
awareness of the problem of these species. Yet, the emerging regime is marred by its 
piecemeal approach, jurisdictional inconsistencies and lacklustre governance and 
coordination mechanisms. 
 
To start with, environmental aspects of the IAS problem are not integrated properly into 
the decision-making processes.217 Although the environmental impacts of IAS are being 
increasingly acknowledged, the design of Australia’s IAS regime does not start from a 
clean slate. It builds on pre-existing regulation that has traditionally equated IAS with the 
eradication and control of pests and diseases affecting the primary production sector.218 
Moreover, this direction has predominantly determined the course of the regime for over 
two centuries – a state of affairs that is not helped by the lack of a national IAS strategy 
and the perfunctory treatment given to IAS by the EPBC Act. 
 
The lack of a national IAS strategy counters recommendations emanating from the 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD that advocates the use of such strategies as an 
important way of coordinating national regimes.219 Although Australia has adopted 
strategies dealing with individual components of the IAS problem, such as weeds and 
pest animals, these strategies do not deal with the IAS problem in a holistic and 
coordinated way. Even the newly-negotiated Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Biosecurity, which is promoted as dealing with environmental impacts of IAS, will not 
necessarily deal with those IAS already present or established in Australia. It is telling 
that where the States and Territories have adopted biosecurity strategies220 the priority 
                                                 
214 Ibid, at 3, 11. 
215 Ibid, at 12. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Noel Dawson, Review of Progress on Invasive Species Final Report to Department of Environment and 
Heritage, Agtrans Research Department of Environment and Heritage Canberra (2005) 129-30; Natural 
Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-2030, 
above n 46, at 25. 
218 Noel Dawson, Review of Progress on Invasive Species Final Report to Department of Environment and 
Heritage, above n 217 at 130. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity 
Conservation Strategy 2010-2030, above n 46, at 25. 
219 Decision VI/23 of the Conference of the Parties. Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 62, at paragraph 10. 
220 For example, Queensland Government, Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, Queensland, 
Queensland Biosecurity Strategy  2009-14, Queensland Government, Department of Primary Industries and 
Fisheries, (2008); NSW Department of Primary Industries, Biosecurity Strategy (undated) NSW 
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given to environmental considerations varies. The Queensland Biosecurity Strategy 2009-
14 endeavours to integrate environmental matters related to IAS with biosecurity;221 
while the New South Wales strategy does not. However, the New South Wales 
Biosecurity Strategy is supplemented by a dedicated Invasive Species Plan.222 Western 
Australia has not yet developed a dedicated biosecurity strategy, although a policy 
statement with respect to biosecurity, which does not emphasise environmental matters, 
is available on the web site of the Western Australian department of Agriculture and 
Food.223 These problems are further aggravated by the fact that the EPBC Act does not 
offer a sufficient over-arching response to the threats of IAS. While section 301A of that 
Act specifies that regulations may be promulgated to tackle IAS, to date, only one 
regulation has been made that permits rangers to control or remove species from 
Commonwealth Reserves for the ‘protection of public safety or for the protection and 
conservation of biodiversity and heritage’ in that reserve.224   
 
Perhaps one of the biggest drawbacks of the regime is the lack of a legislatively-based 
and uniform definition for ‘invasive alien species’. While related terms, such as ‘native’ 
or ‘indigenous’ are often defined, these characterizations vary greatly. The Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), for example, interprets indigenous wildlife as wildlife not 
originally introduced by humans into Australia, unless this occurred before the year 
1600;225 the Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 2006 (NT) defines indigenous 
plants and animals to include species introduced by Aboriginal peoples before the year 
1788;226 while the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (Tas) interprets ‘native’ flora 
and fauna as those species that occur naturally in Tasmania. The Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) defines a native species to include one that 
was present in Australia or an external Territory before 1400. Since definitions can act as 
triggers for implementation of measures, this plethora of meanings and descriptions 
across jurisdictions makes it difficult to achieve consistency in the regime.  
 
The situation is further compounded by the fact that the concept of ‘invasive’ also needs 
improved clarification. As already discussed, legislation can categorize species as 
‘noxious’ or a ‘pest’, yet that categorization tends largely to focus on economically 
important species, such as feral goats, rabbits, and foxes.227 Moreover, because such 
                                                                                                                                                 
Department of Primary Industries; Department of Primary Industries, Biosecurity Strategy for Victoria,  
Biosecurity Victoria (2009).   
221 See for example, Queensland Biosecurity Strategy 2009-14, above n 220, at page 6 where the 
interlinkages amongst quarantine, environment and trade are mapped. 
222 New South Wales Government, Department of Primary Industries, ‘New South Wales Invasive Species 
Plan 2008-2015’, above n 188, at 23.  In addition, regions have also produced invasive species strategies, 
see for example Brisbane City Council, ‘Brisbane Invasive Species Management Plan July 2007-June 
2011’ above n, 212. 
223  Department of Agriculture and Food, Agriculture Biosecurity in Western Australia,  
<http://www.agric.wa.gov.au/PC_93118.html?s=1001 > (last visited March 2011). 
224 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations 2000 - Regulation 12.66. 
225 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), schedule – Dictionary. 
226 Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 2006 (NT), section 9. 
227 Australian Pest Animal Strategy, above n 152, at page 1. 
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categorizations will inevitably occur once the species already become invasive,228 
classification of species as ‘noxious’ or a ‘pest’ may not adequately capture the potential 
of species to cause damage. These approaches foster the creation of regimes that are 
reactive, rather than proactive.229 While a reactive approach can assist regulators in 
making short-term decisions on how to allocate resources,230 it is not necessarily an 
effective long-term strategy. The latter needs to incorporate process that identify, monitor 
and eradicate potential IAS.231 Even so, settling an overarching definition of an IAS will 
not be easy, for classifying a species as an IAS guides regimes towards consideration of 
broader issues regarding management of natural resources, including management of land 
and water usage. In the context of IAS, this task is made all the more difficult by the 
divergent uses and conflicting values humans have for certain species. Hence, regulation 
of IAS may be coloured by the fact that one person’s IAS is another’s useful resource.232  
 
The plant Echium plantagineum, for example, is regarded as “Paterson’s Curse” by 
Australian graziers, because its leaves are poisonous to cattle, while bee-keepers refer to 
it as “Salvation Jane”, because its pollen provides food for bees.233 Consequently, 
effective regulation also requires the political will to take into account the fact that a 
species may be an invasive alien species, even though it provides economic benefits to 
one product sector. More recently, in the Australian state of Victoria, efforts to classify 
the browsing and grazing activities of the introduced Sambar deer as a ‘threatening 
process’234 resulted in protracted litigation commenced by the Australian Deer 
                                                 
228Examples include Bitou Bush and Rubber Vine, State of Queensland, Department of Primary Industries 
and Fisheries, ‘Weeds of National Significance Update 2008, State of Queensland, Department of Primary 
Industries and Fisheries (2008) at 8 and 38; available from 
<http://www.weeds.org.au/docs/WONS_update_2008.pdf > (last visited march 2011). 
229For discussion of strategies implemented by the Commonwealth for established weeds see Jennifer 
Bellamy, Dan Metcalfe, Nigel Weston and Steven Dawson, Evaluation of Invasive Species (Weeds) 
Outcomes of Regional Investment, Australian Government, (2005), (v). Available from 
<http://www.nrm.gov.au/publications/books/pubs/evaluation-weeds.pdf> (last visited March 2011). 
230 Pam Clunie, Ivor Stuart, Matthew Jones, Di Crowther, Sabine Schreiber, Shanaugh McKay, Justin 
O'Connor, David McLaren, John Weiss, Lalith Gunasekera and Dr. Jane Roberts, A Risk Assessment of the 
Impacts of Pest Species in the Riverine Environment in the Murray-Darling Basin, Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment, Arthur Rylah Institute, Heidelberg, Victoria, (2002),at 2 where the report 
notes that the ‘classification of a pest is often based on economic criteria when the damage caused by a pest 
species justifies the costs of a control program’. 
231 Jeffrey A McNeely, Harold A Mooney, Laurie E Neville, Peter Johan Schei and Jeffrey K Waage (ed), 
A Global Strategy on Invasive Alien Species IUCN Gland Switzerland and Cambridge UK, in collaboration 
with the Global Invasive Species Programme (GISP) (2001) paragraphs 2.1 and 6.2. 
232 See generally, Douglas O Linder, ‘Are All Species Created Equal? And Other Questions Shaping 
Wildlife Law’, (1988) 12 Harvard Environmental Law Review 157, at 163. 
233 See Richard Groves, Robert Boden and Mark Lonsdale, Jumping the Garden Fence Invasive Plants in 
Australia and their Environmental and Agricultural Impacts a CSIRO report for WWF, WWF-Australia 
(2005) 29. 
234 Application made pursuant to the Victorian Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 to list “Degradation 
and loss of terrestrial habitats caused by Sambar (Cervus unicolour)” as a threatening process. The 
nomination was accepted with some modifications in June 2006. See, Scientific Advisory Committee 
acceptance of nomination as a threatening process: Reduction in biodiversity of native vegetation by 
Sambar (Cervus unicolor) (June 2006) available at  
<http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/101E5CCD017DCBBBCA25753F0018F6A9/$File/FF
G+processes+list+November+2008.pdf> (last visited March 2011); Department of Sustainability and 
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Association Inc.235 Although the litigation was unsuccessful, it highlights the difficulties 
regulators face in coordinating regimes where stakeholders have differing agendas and 
objectives.  
 
Elsewhere, the IAS regime is typified by legislative and policy instruments that deal with 
specific components of the IAS problem in a fragmented manner, 236 although, as already 
discussed, some jurisdictions, such as New South Wales, are developing overarching 
strategies.237 Notwithstanding the number of instruments, they do not always cover the 
full range of IAS. For example, the National Pest Animal Strategy refers to vertebrate 
animals such as mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish of national significance,238 
but does not cover invertebrates such as insects. These are managed on a case-by-case 
basis, as a ‘key threatening process’239 or as a quarantine issue.240  
 
Another feature of the regime is that the States and Territories are concerned with and 
also manage those IAS located within their own jurisdictions. This represents an 
administrative expedience and is also a mechanism that taps into local know-how. Often, 
fine-tuning policy or implementing regimes may be more successful if addressed at a 
localised level, such as occurred with the removal of kikuyu grass from Montague 
Island.241 However, from a national perspective this type of regulation can lead to the 
development of a fragmented regime. The difficulty stems not so much from the fact that 
issues are addressed at a regional or local level, but from the lack of strategic guidance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Environment (Victoria) Draft Flora and Fauna Guarantee Action Statement, Reduction in Biodiversity of 
Native Vegetation by Sambar (Cervus unicolor), available 
at<http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/352922211DC08D48CA25754D00146FBC/$File/Re
duction+in+biodiversity+by+Sambar+AS.pdf> (last visited March 2011).   
235 The Australian Deer Association has approximately 2,500 members and represents interest of deer 
hunters and deer conservationists. Their web site is located at <http://www.austdeer.com.au/index.php> 
(last visited March 2011). Australian Deer Association Inc v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria 
[2008] VSC 204. 
236Some examples include the Queensland Government, Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, 
Queensland, Queensland Biosecurity Strategy  2009-14, , above n 220. NSW Department of Primary 
Industries, Biosecurity Strategy (undated) NSW, above n 220; Department of Primary Industries, 
Biosecurity Strategy for Victoria,  above n 220; South Australia is in the process of formulating its 
Biosecurity strategy for 2009-14 following the release of a draft document titled ‘One Biosecurity: a 
working partnership’, released in December 2008.See  
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/pirsa/biosecurity/south_australias_biosecurity_strategy> (last visited march 
2011). 
237 New South Wales Invasive Species Plan 2008-2015. 
238 Australian Pest Animal Strategy, above n 152, at page (ii).   
239 See for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Threat Abatement Plan to Reduce the Impacts of Tramp 
Ants on Biodiversity in Australia and Its Territories, Department of the Environment and Heritage, 
Canberra (2006).  Available from 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/publications/tap/pubs/tramp-ants.pdf> (last 
visited March 2011). 
240 In Western Australia, for example, where the notion of a ‘threatening process’ is not specifically 
integrated into legislation, the Department of Agriculture takes action against specific IAS, such as bumble 
bees, that it consisders a significant problem. See Government of Western Australia, Department of 
Agriculture, ‘Bumble Genus Bombus’, (2004) 14 Gardennote 1-2. 
241 See fact sheet, ‘Montague Island Nature Reserve – Seabird Habitat Restoration Project’ New South 
Wales Government, Department of the Environment, Climate Change and Water, May 2004.  
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and coordination. Not only does the regime develop in a piecemeal way, but it also fails 
to identify in a timely manner those species that are transitioning from a localized 
problem into a widespread problem. Such is the case with cane toads,242 a notorious IAS 
in Australia, which for many years was a problem confined to the state of Queensland, 
but which has now developed into an IAS of national proportions.243 This illustration also 
stresses the need for caution when designing and implementing regimes based on 
administrative or political boundaries that do not also take into account the ecological 
reach of a species.  
 
Another flaw in the regime stems from the fact that the States and Territories provide 
differing regulatory foundations for similar parts of their systems. It will be recalled that 
some jurisdictions adopt policy instruments to support key procedures, such as the listing 
of threatening processes, while others have enacted legislation. What is more, even once 
a threatening process has been listed, the jurisdictions vary in the degree of obligation 
regarding outcomes and consequences. In accordance with the EPBC Act, the Minister 
must prepare a threat-abatement plan, but only if the plan is a feasible and efficient way 
of managing the threat;244 in New South Wales, the Minister ‘may’ prepare a plan at his 
or her discretion;245 while in Victoria, the minister must prepare a threat-abatement 
plan.246 In those states such as Western Australia and Queensland, where the listing of a 
threatening process is based on policy, so too are proposals for further action. While the 
use of policy instruments, in the form of plans and strategies can assist in the 
development of regimes, it also represents the use of extra parliamentary processes; and 
can lead to lack of consistency, inadequate transparency and insufficient accountability. 
In particular, policy instruments cannot provide for the enforcement of regimes by way of 
penalties which are often necessary to buttress responsive-type regulation.247 
Accordingly, policy instruments need to be counterbalanced by sufficient legislative and 
institutional mechanisms in order to foster more successful implementation of regimes. 
 
Australia has a more consistent approach towards IAS with respect to international border 
controls in quarantine, these being uniformly devised in accordance with the Quarantine 
Act. However, a recent report on Australia’s quarantine, One Biosecurity, A Working 
Partnership: The Independent Review of Australia’s Quarantine and Biosecurity 
Arrangements Report to the Australian Government, (the Beale Report) identified a 
weakness in the system stemming from lack of synergy between the Commonwealth and 
the States with respect to ‘post-border controls of biosecurity risks’.248 This is an 
                                                 
242 The cane toad was introduced in June 1935 to control insects destroying sugar crops in the Australian 
state of Queensland. It provided valueless for this purpose, but soon developed a taste for native Australian 
species. Australian Museum, Fact Sheet Cane Toads, Giant Toads or Marine Toads (2003) Available at 
<http://www.austmus.gov.au/factsheets/canetoad.htm> (last visited March 2011). 
243 See fact sheet, ‘Action on Cane Toads’, Australian Government, Department of the Environment, 
Water, Heritage and the Arts, Climate Change and Water, 2009.  
244 EPBC Act, section 270A. 
245 Threatened Species Conservation Act, section 13. 
246 Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act, section 19. 
247John Braithwaite, ‘Rewards and Regulation’, (2002) 29 (1) Journal of Law and Society, 12. 
248 Roger Beale, Jeff Fairbrother, Andrew Inglis, David Trebeck, One Biosecurity, A Working Partnership: 
The Independent Review of Australia’s Quarantine and Biosecurity Arrangements Report to the Australian 
Government, Commonwealth of Australia (2008), xviii, 19. 
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important finding, for even in the most stringent regimes, unwanted species will gain 
entry,249 – and once this occurs IAS are difficult if not impossible to eradicate. Lack of 
appropriate post-border activities also presents a formidable challenge to the integration 
of monitoring activities and evaluation of policy outcomes against environmental 
concerns. In particular, without monitoring, it is hard to assess the status of an introduced 
species to determine whether it is advancing its range and in danger of becoming an IAS.  
 
Overall, the regime is in need of improved legislative and institutional support in order to 
achieve a more consistent and coordinated approach to the problem of IAS. 250 
 
 
     7.  IMPROVING THE REGIME 
 
Part 3 of this paper identified two key governance mechanisms necessary for fulfilling 
international obligations under article 8(h) of the CBD: the requirement to coordinate 
measures in a cross-sectoral manner; and the need to underpin regimes with adequate 
institutional arrangements. The two mechanisms are related, for coordination of measures 
is part of the institutional arrangements of regimes. In addition, as already discussed, 
Shine, Williams and Gundling have identified three pathways to enhance coordination. It 
will be recalled that the first way comprises a ‘unitary legislative framework’; the second 
method consists of a coordinating body with sufficient legislative authority to harmonise 
objectives; and the third method envisages a coordinating body that lacks legislative 
power to harmonize IAS processes, but which can coordinate activities on a policy or 
political basis.   
 
Each of these pathways is predicated on the establishment of a national body, although 
with differing levels of control and power. To implement either of the first two choices 
the Federal government would need to take a leadership role based on legislative control. 
This could theoretically be achieved by an enhanced exercise of existing legislative 
power under the Commonwealth Constitution, or by the states referring powers to the 
Federal government. To implement the third alternative, the Federal government could 
establish a coordinating body, either as a Ministerial Council under COAG or as a 
separate body, but one that operates under the auspices of existing ministerial councils. 
The third alternative could also be supplemented with selected legislative and/or policy 
instruments to improve coordination of activities across the jurisdictions.  
 
 
7.2 Enhanced Legislative Control 
 
As previously discussed,251 the Australian Federal Parliament does not enjoy the benefit 
of specific environmental law-making powers. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the 
                                                 
249The outbreak of equine influenza in Australia in 2007 was thought to have occurred due to a breakdown 
in quarantine processes at Sydney’s Kingsford-Smith airport; Ian Callinan, Equine Influenza, The August 
2007 Outbreak in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008 at 5.  
250 Mark Burgman, Terry Walshe, Lee Godden, Paul Martin, ‘Designing Regulation for Conservation and 
Biosecurity’ (2009) 13 (1) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 93, 110.  
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Federal Parliament can use existing heads of power in the Constitution to legislate for a 
wider range of matters with regard to IAS than it currently does. In addition, it is open to 
the states to refer some or all of their law-making powers with respect to IAS to the 
Federal government. 
 
Heads of power relevant to IAS under the Commonwealth Constitution include the trade 
and commerce power under section 51(i), the external affairs power under section 
51(xxix), the quarantine power under section 51(ix) and the corporations power under 
section 51(xx). None of these heads of power provides a dedicated or complete platform 
for Australia-wide IAS regulation. With respect to the external affairs power, for 
example, it will be recalled that the High Court held that any Federal laws need to 
achieve a reasonable degree of proportionality between the objectives of the law and the 
method by which those objectives are achieved.252 In the context of IAS, Justice Deane 
provided a relevant example: 
 
…a law requiring that all sheep in Australia be slaughtered would not be 
sustainable as a law with respect to external affairs merely because Australia was a 
party to some international convention which required the taking of steps to 
safeguard against the spread of some obscure sheep disease which had been 
detected in sheep in a foreign country and which had not reached these shores. The 
absence of any reasonable proportionality between the law and the purpose of 
discharging the obligation under the convention would preclude characterization 
as a law with respect to external affairs. 253 
 
This quote denotes a three-staged approach for examining the validity of Federal 
legislation pursuant to the external affairs power: the existence of an international treaty 
requiring that Australia take steps to stop the introduction and spread of IAS; the 
likelihood that the IAS would cause damage in Australia if it reached our shores; and a 
determination that any Federal law is proportional to the risk posed by the IAS. 
 
Australia is a party to a number of international treaties concerning IAS, including: the 
CBD, the International Plant Protection Convention 1997,254 and the International 
Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for Dealing with 
Contagious Diseases of Animals, and Annex 1924.255 In combination, these treaties 
require members to implement regimes dealing with the full range of IAS, including the 
establishment of appropriate governance mechanisms.256 Moreover, the importance of 
                                                                                                                                                 
251 See discussion above in part 4 of this paper. 
252 Commonwealth v Tasmania, Dean J at paragraph 21. 
253 Ibid.  
254International Plant Protection Convention 1997, above n 60. 
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256 CBD, article 8(h), International Plant Protection Convention 1997, articles IV, VII and VIII; 
International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for Dealing with Contagious 
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IAS to Australia is underscored by Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-
2030 that has singled out the problem of IAS as a major threat to Australia’ biodiversity; 
and set a target reduction of the impacts of IAS of at least 10% by 2015. 257 Bearing these 
points in mind, it is at least arguable that the Federal Government could claim bona fide 
implementation of a range of international treaties, to legislate for a holistic IAS regime.  
 
Yet another avenue open to the Federal government is to combine the external affairs 
power with other heads of power, such as those pertaining to trade and commerce, 
quarantine and trading corporations. The technique of combining a number of heads of 
power to support Federal legislation is well established;258 however, the validity of the 
legislation still depends on the ambit of the underlying section 51 powers. The boundaries 
of section 51 heads of power have not been tested with respect to IAS and attempts by the 
Federal government to expand its law-making power could trigger legal challenges. By 
way of example, the scope of the quarantine power under section 51(ix) has not been 
judicially determined. Indeed, the section itself just uses the one word, ‘quarantine’. 
Section 4 of the Australian Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) describes quarantine in terms of 
processes and outcomes that include measures to prevent or control ‘the introduction, 
establishment or spread of diseases or pests’.259 This concept gives the notion of 
quarantine a wide meaning that not only contemplates preventing the introduction of 
species, but also of preventing their establishment and spread. If section 51(ix) were to be 
given a similarly wide interpretation, this would allow the Federal government to 
introduce virtual Australia-wide law with respect to species introduced into the country. 
What is not certain, however, is whether section 51(ix) could be interpreted widely 
enough to underpin Federal legislation covering existing IAS, especially those currently 
found solely within the boundaries of only one State or Territory.  
 
A more practical problem flows from the fact that even if the Federal parliament were 
able to expand its current law-making activities across all Australian jurisdictions, this 
does not necessarily equate to more effective outcomes.260 Given the pre-existing 
involvement of the States and Territories in matters relevant to the problem of IAS, the 
Federal government still needs to consider how best to involve the States and Territories 
when drawing lines of authority, formulating policy and designing rules. These are 
complex matters for determination in any regime, but made more complex in a Federal 
system of government where law-making powers are shared. 261 As the Australian Senate 
has pointed out, ‘there will often be some tension between the different levels of 
government as to the most appropriate distribution of roles and responsibilities.’262 
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Keeping in mind that the Federal government needs the cooperation of the States and 
Territories to establish a consistent and coordinated approach to IAS, imposing uniform 
laws would do little to secure that cooperation. 
 
The difficulties are illustrated by the aftermath of an attempt in 2002, by Senator Andrew 
Bartlett to introduce a private member’s Bill into Federal Parliament dealing with IAS: 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Invasive 
Species) Bill 2002 (Invasive Species Bill). The bill proposed amendments to the EPBC 
Act which would have included the construction and maintenance of a national data base 
of invasive alien species263 and the establishment of an Invasive Species Advisory 
Committee.264 This Committee would have acted as a unifying institution for the 
regulation of IAS by drawing together a diverse range of stakeholders to advise cabinet 
Ministers of the impacts of IAS. These features of the Bill would have made headway 
towards resolving some of the problems with Australia’s IAS regime particularly those 
stemming from fragmented regulation and lack of coordination.  
However, the Bill never became law, having been rejected by Federal Parliament. In the 
ensuing Senate inquiry, ‘Turning Back the Tide, the Invasive Species Challenge’ (the 
Senate Inquiry), 265 the investigation concluded that the Bill demonstrated a 
‘commendable, if somewhat idealistic, approach [potentially leading to] risks and 
confusion.’ 266 Key criticisms centred on resource constraints that the Federal government 
would have faced in implementing a fully functioning IAS regime267 and the perceived 
imbalance that the Bill would have created with respect to governance mechanisms 
established under co-operative Federalism. With respect to the latter, several State and 
Territory governments voiced their concerns at the scope and breadth of powers that the 
Federal government would need to exercise in order to implement the provisions of the 
bill.268 The caution displayed by the States towards an expansion of Federal Parliament’s 
jurisdiction may also render unfeasible any proposed referral of powers.  
Section 51 (xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution permits the Federal Parliament to make 
laws on matters referred to it by the States. In theory, the States could transfer their law-
making powers for IAS to the Federal Parliament. However, given the anxiety that 
greeted the introduction of the Invasive Species Bill, it is unlikely that the States would 
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consider a wholesale referral of their IAS regimes. The IAS regime traverses many 
domains and disciplines, including environmental law, quarantine regulation and land use 
management. The power to regulate for IAS could provide the means for the Federal 
government to intrude into many other legislative and policy areas traditionally regarded 
as state jurisdiction. It may be more likely that the States would negotiate a partial 
referral of their legislative powers. Yet even in this case, the difficulties inherent in 
framing a mutually-acceptable referral of powers are typified by the dispute over 
corporate law regulation and the limitations on the exercise of legislative power imposed 
by the States on the eventual referral.269 An alternative approach lies in overhauling the 
coordination of the existing regime, supported by selected overarching legislative 




7.2 Enhanced Coordination 
 
The need for a better coordinated IAS regime was acknowledged by the Senate Inquiry 
on invasive species. Although the inquiry vetoed the enactment of the Invasive Species 
Bill, it did make a number of recommendations reflecting key concepts of the Bill, such 
as those relating to better coordination of the IAS regime and enhanced Federal 
leadership. More precisely, the Senate Inquiry called for the Federal government to take 
an enhanced role in providing leadership ‘by developing a robust national framework, in 
consultation with State, Territory and local governments, to regulate, control and manage 
invasive species’.270 Additionally, the Inquiry recommended that the Federal government 
promulgate IAS regulations under s301A of the EPBC Act.271 The recommendations, 
however, stopped short of proposing the establishment of a co-ordinating institution, such 
as an Invasive Species Advisory Body, leaving open the means by which the Federal 
government should achieve better coordination.  
 
 
Some five years later, in 2009, a review of the EPBC Act made similar recommendations 
– specifically that the Federal parliament use section 301A to make regulations for IAS272 
and that the Federal government undertake a more pro-active leadership role. With 
respect to the latter, the review particularly singled out: the development of protocols to 
deal with the movement of IAS across jurisdictions; 273 the design of systems to identify 
potential threats to the environment from IAS; and the creation of a Unit or Taskforce to 
‘guide management responses’ with respect to these threats. 274 The importance of 
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coordination is established in other regulatory areas, such as bushfire management275 and 
administration of the chemical industry.276 In these sectors, one of the most significant 
barriers to effective management has been identified as lack of coordination, especially 
where large numbers of agencies and institutions are involved. 277 Regulators face crucial 
challenges integrating ‘multiple values, multiple stakeholders [and] different interests’.278 
Analogies can readily be drawn from these regimes to the management of IAS. For 
example, the Australian Emergency Marine Pest Plan,279 has identified at least 22 
Australian government agencies,280 State and Territory agencies281 and marine industry 
and environmental organizations 282 that are concerned with the management of marine 
IAS. In the regulation of terrestrial IAS, interested stakeholders include volunteers such 
as Landcare,283 those involved in primary production, the hunting lobby,284 and 
government agencies, such as the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics and Sciences (ABARES),285 the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
286 and Biosecurity Australia.287  
 
Coordinating efforts against IAS allows States and Territories to focus on IAS relevant to 
their own jurisdictions, but with the advantage of strategic institutional support for 
allocation of funds, collating information and tracking the development and 
implementation of regimes in an integrated manner.288 Hence, coordination should not be 
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viewed as a pathway to the ‘lowest common denominator’. The Beale report for example 
has recommended the establishment of uniform and centralized regulation with respect to 
quarantine and biosecurity.289 This would permit the Federal government to set an upper 
ceiling on biosecurity measures, allowing goods landed at any port in Australia to move 
freely across the country. However, because such regulation would override State and 
Territory quarantine laws, the report also acknowledged the need for any centralized 
system to take regional and local conditions into account.290  
 
Coordination of efforts can be delivered within the parameters of COAG. Although 
COAG is styled as ‘cooperative federalism’, in practice, the strategies and plans adopted 
through COAG allow for coordinated efforts as much as cooperative efforts.291 In order 
to work towards achieving cohesion and unity out of the present system there are at least 
three actions the Federal government can take: first, adopt a uniform definition of IAS; 
second, adopt a National IAS Strategy; and third, establish an advisory or coordinating 
body either as a stand-alone institution or as a Ministerial Council devoted to IAS. The 
need for a uniform definition has already been discussed as a legislative gap. Due to the 
fact that definitions set the parameters for regulation, it is a flaw that requires urgent 
attention before Australia can achieve improved governance of its IAS regime. 
 
The second suggestion, the formulation of a National IAS Strategy, offers a number of 
tangible benefits. Problems with the piecemeal approach of the present regime include 
the fact that common goals are not consistent, that current strategies do not cover all IAS, 
and that the regime emphasizes some product sectors such as primary production over 
environmental concerns. A dedicated national strategy would in effect supply a ‘road 
map’ for regulatory unity, both in an institutional and practical sense, fostering common 
goals and making it more likely that policy objectives will be achieved.292 The strategy 
would also provide guidance for dealing with conflicts such as the one already discussed 
that occurred in the Australian state of Victoria with respect to the introduced Sambar 
deer. Moreover, a national strategy can also help strengthen the effectiveness of IAS 
regimes by promoting the monitoring of species and sharing of information which can be 
analysed and used to implement improved action plans. Finally, in common with 
strategies developed for pest animals and weeds, a national IAS strategy would reinforce 
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the need for, and provide direction to, the development of appropriate institutional and 
legislative frameworks supplemented by policies and programs.293  
 
The notion of improved institutional frameworks channels into the third suggested 
improvement, the establishment of an advisory or coordinating body. Such bodies are 
well-accepted in other areas of regulation such as the marine environment,294 human 
health,295 and immunisation programmes.296 Regional advisory committees have already 
been established on an ad hoc basis to deal with specific IAS such as weeds.297 The 
functions of the coordinating body could extend to acting in a consultative capacity to 
target actions and streamline regulation. In particular, with respect to the latter, the 
advisory body could act as a focal point to identify gaps, duplication and inconsistencies 
among the Federal, State and Territory regimes. 
 
Ministerial Councils represent yet another means of enhancing Australia’s regulation of 
IAS. More specifically, COAG could establish a new Ministerial Council on invasive 
species that draws together decision-makers from key portfolios, such as the Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage 
and the Arts and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. By bringing these 
portfolios together, a new Ministerial Council on invasive species would facilitate 
institutional unification of IAS regulation. However, COAG has stipulated that there is a 
presumption against the establishment of additional Ministerial Councils;298 hence, it is 
unlikely that CAOG would endorse the creation of an additional Council targeting IAS. 
Consequently, the establishment of an independent body that can advise government 
might be a more likely scenario.  
 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
In structuring the regime to deal with the problem of IAS, the Federal government has 
endeavoured to build on pre-existing systems developed to manage an assortment of 
unwanted species, such as weeds, feral animals and other declared pests. Due to 
complexities inherent in operating within a multi-layered system of government, the 
Federal government has chosen not to use prescriptive legislative power, even where, 
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arguably, it has the legal right to do so. Instead, it has set itself up as a meta-regulator that 
supervises how that power is exercised.299 
 
However, for this type of governance arrangement operate at an optimum, the meta-
regulator needs to ensure that it maintains its supervisory role in an effective manner.300 
It is a jurisdictional conundrum that is not easily resolved, particularly in Australia where 
environmental governance ‘…is hampered by a lack of integrated policy and planning 
between’ the different levels of government. 301  
 
Shine, Williams and Gundling have identified three proposed governance models for IAS 
regulation. Each model is based on varying degrees of central control; and each is 
supported by coordinating mechanisms. As Australia currently lacks such mechanisms, 
this paper has argued that the time has come to reconsider Australia’s governance 
arrangements for IAS. At the very least, the Federal government should draft a uniform 
definition of an IAS, adopt a national IAS strategy, and establish a national advisory body 
or Ministerial Council with respect to IAS. Even in the absence of comprehensive Federal 
legislation, the Federal government can pass considered legislation and use its political 
influence to help shape State and Territory regimes.302 This type of approach would go 
some way towards enhancing governance mechanisms for IAS and also assist in 
achieving policy and institutional unification for these problematic species. 
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